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Violence, Wars, Peace, Security

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Summary

The issues of conflict, violence, and social progress and their interrelations have long been topics of philosophical discussion. Underling this chapter is the necessity to achieve social change and social progress through public action. Violence, especially in its more intense and extreme forms, often serves as a major impediment to social progress; it leads to or catalyzes a range of direct physical and humanitarian harms for the population (such as human losses and displacement), as well as socioeconomic, environmental, and other damage. However, social change may itself imply popular protest against repressive conditions such as repressive governments, foreign occupation, or colonial rule. This protest may be exercised through non-violent means, but sometimes through violence.

The chapter notes a long-term decline in number and intensity of wars, at least since the Korean and Vietnam wars. However, there are also data demonstrating a troubling rise in armed conflicts since the early 2000s, including historically high levels of terrorism. Significant geographical variations are suggestive for managing this phenomenon. Some regions have seen a steady decline in organized political violence (East Asia, South and Central America); some regions or countries experience far more terrorism than others (notably the Middle East, South Asia, some states in Europe). Homicide rates decline with increasing human development and social integration, while suicide rates do not follow the same pattern. Also the sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations show variations, indicating that this phenomenon too can be averted among non-state actors (guerilla groups, liberation movements).

In respect to the means of violence, notably weapons development, nuclear weapons inventories have been reduced, but remain at very high levels. Global military expenditures have seen a marked rise, not least in the Middle East and for some major powers (China, Russia), while still not even close to the arsenals of the United States.

These powers are the top producers of small arms, the types of weapons mostly used in conflicts in Africa, for instance.

The continued prevalence of violence and weapons impede the possibilities of social progress and needs to be reversed. However, the international actions for controlling this lacks in commitment and enforcement. The UN system has been activated since the end of the Cold War, but has had difficulties in responding to the challenges of the past few years, most obviously revealed in the highly internationalized civil war in Syria. Similarly, disarmament measures have not moved forward. There seems to be little prospect for further nuclear weapons reductions, although the international agreement on Iran's nuclear technology is encouraging. A significant recent treaty is the Arms Trade Treaty, which now is being tested in monitoring illicit arms trade, and still lacks support of key major powers.

There is headway in the field of peacemaking and mediation, and where the negotiated endings to armed conflicts have become more frequent and of increasingly quality. Similarly, the notion of peacebuilding has emerged as a new and evolving response. As is the case with peacemaking there is a need for building international, regional, and new national institutions. State capacity is important as the state is expected to be the responder to increases in violence and to lead society toward social progress. "Weak" states need to be understood in terms of a lack of state capacity or legitimacy, or both. Of high importance is also the degree of ethnic and/or ethno-confessional diversity and representation. There is ample proof that the lack of participation in policy-making, as well as other forms of inequality and marginalization of large population groups increases the risk of conflict and violence. Gender inequality has a connection to the onset, in particular of civil wars. New social media play a role – not in the creation of conflict as such – but in the mobilization of a population.

Decreasing inequalities among ethnic groups and along gender lines suggest a more hopeful long-term trend, as does democratization. However, if a democratic system does not address the issues of ethnic, religious, and sociopolitical inclusion, territorial divisions, and power sharing, it may result in increased tension, conflict, and violence.

In addition, this chapter addresses the issues of global governance with respect to the management and prevention of conflicts and violence. It observes that there are geo-political variations, i.e. that the same issue may be substantially different from one region to another, thus making uniform measures inapplicable. It is also noteworthy that much global cooperation still rests on informal arrangements, which make UN Security Council action possible at certain instances, but may also impede implementation of decisions. There is a need for global, national, and local institutions that are stable, solid, and sustainable.

This chapter invites the readers to come with suggestions for conclusion building, for instance, on notions such as resilience, human security, and human rights.

10.1 Introduction

Chapter 10 deals with the human experience of physical violence from the individual to the global level. This relates to social progress in two different ways. First of all it is argued that *an overall reduction in violence in itself constitutes social progress.* It means meeting the ambitions "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" as expressed in the first sentence of the UN Charter from 1945. This could be done by reducing (or even eliminating) organized violence and war from human existence. This goal is, of course, colored by two world wars and an unprecedented genocide, the Holocaust, all taking place within half a century, a uniquely violent experience for humankind. On the whole, the UN position is likely to be shared by most peoples and governments, as all UN member states have signed the UN Charter. Still, there is a contradiction, as most states build power on their monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Furthermore, through a series of the international agreements on human rights states have agreed to restrain their use of physical powers. This should be regarded as an element of social progress in its ability to curtail state violence.[4]

This notwithstanding, one must be aware that a reduction of violence does not necessarily or automatically mean social progress. For instance, violence may disappear from a neighborhood with a history of riots as drug dealers impose local "peace" in order to pursue their business without the presence of police and media. And there are theoretical and philosophical arguments for the necessity of violence or its positive role in at least certain extreme cases. It has been said that in order to achieve social change, violence may be a means for social progress. Some would argue that without violence, colonial domination, for example, would not have come to an end (or at least not as quickly). This can be debated. Also, the idea that some revolutionary processes have brought social progress can be discussed. Even if not as influential as in the past, there is a strong intellectual and political tradition that connects violence and emancipation of some groups, notably the working class, as pursued within Marxism and Leninism, but also in writings by committed intellectuals, notably Georges Sorel or Franz Fanon.[5] At the same time there are equally strong traditions of principled as well as pragmatic refusal to use violence for social progress, as witnessed in cleavages between reformists and revolutionaries in most liberation movements.

Empirically, it can be observed that social change may itself imply popular protest against repressive governments, foreign occupation or colonial rule. Such protest can often be exercised through non-violent means, as was the case in series of examples of decolonization, notably India, Ghana, or South Africa. The extent of repression may sometimes direct legitimate protest into violent liberation. Great revolutions certainly achieved change of political leadership, notably in the United States, France, Russia, and China, but real social progress was in fact limited and often undone by the continued resort to violence to uphold the influence of the new holders of state power. Furthermore, it is quite clear that non-state actors' use of violence also legitimizes the state's use of violence.

Intellectually and morally this provides room for change through other means, notably active non-violence, national mass mobilization for social change as well as international sanctions and other forms of external pressure that may support internal transformations. Empirical evidence supports the idea that change through non-violence tends to bring more democracy and human rights than violent revolutions.

A second way to see the relations between violence and social progress is to argue that *social progress means adding something to society that prevents continued recurrence of violent conflict.* For instance, if the resort to violence is rooted in discrimination, inequality and injustice (which often is the case, as this chapter demonstrates), then the attainment of human rights and human dignity as well as daily physical safety for all inhabitants for the foreseeable future *is* social progress.[6] Once the fear of physical attack on individuals, groups, or the society is no longer present human capacity is released for building a more reliant, sustainable society. This is a world society that approaches quality peace. Such a positive vision is enshrined in the second sentence of the UN Charter that reaffirms "faith in fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." This has more recently been included in the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 set up by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, notably Goal 16 that aims to "promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies."

In this chapter, we depart from the assumption that the *reduction of violence is not the same as the rejection of conflict.*[7] On the contrary, social conflict is needed for progress. This is the essence of public debate, popular protest, and non-violent campaigns. However, we point to the importance of a line where conflicts no longer become constructive and that this line can be drawn at the threshold of systematic violence. Once a number of people have been killed, a conflict no longer becomes constructive and loses its ability to continuously move a society towards social progress. This means that we must analytically distinguish between conflict and violence. In many historical cases, violence is the contrary of a social movement. For instance, during a century and a half in some industrial countries, the working-class movement contributed by means of their joint struggle to build a welfare state through progressive relations with the owners of industrial production. Their conflict was generally the contrary of violence. But it may also happen that violence is part of a social conflict. It would be too simple to argue that there is always and necessarily a contrary relationship, but nevertheless these are two different phenomena. Social

4 There are such agreements covering most regions of the world, for instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the UN Covenants on Human Rights (1966), the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Charter of Paris (1990), the Istanbul Document 1999, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1998), and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights within OAS (1978).

5 Today one would expect there to be parallel Islamic discussions on the use of violence to promote Islamic value. There is a violence-legitimizing position associated with certain militant Islamic groups, but evidence suggests that this is not likely to be shared by most Muslims. A within-Islam discussion on the limits of violence should be encouraged.

6 This is parallel to notions such as "quality peace." See Wallensteen (2015).

7 See Wieviorka (2009).

progress may always require conflict, but not always violence, while systematic violence normally impedes social progress. The Colombian case is a good illustration of this point: the peace agreement between the Government and the guerilla (FARC) includes ending of armed action, but also the inclusion of the FARC in the legal political system, where it will be a combative but non-violent actor.

We should also note that *"violence" comes in many different forms*, for instance, as "structural" and "cultural" violence (Galtung 1969). Structural violence refers to the life chances that a society denies some of its inhabitants, while privileging others. In the field of health care it is associated with some having lower life expectancies than others. Direct violence refers to the actual killing of human beings. It can be seen as a discussion between developed and underdeveloped continents facing different challenges (e.g. Global North vs. Global South; poor, developing states vs. industrialized ones), sub-regions (e.g. urban vs. rural areas), classes (e.g. rich vs. poor, land owners vs. tenants and landless), or identity groups (e.g. dominant ethnic minorities vs. dominated majorities, as exemplified in Apartheid South Africa). There could also be an additional understanding of this notion of violence, as the *structures of violence*. It leads to a focus on the social institutions that exert direct violence, e.g. the state as such and those that speak in its name and with its authorizations, notably the military forces, police institutions, intelligence operations, prison services, etc. To this we may add *cultural violence*, which includes the cultures that justify or legitimize structural or direct violence (Galtung 1990).

The issues of conflict, violence, peace, and security vary considerably across the globe due to historical conditions (e.g. colonialism, occupation, repression, and earlier wars) and present predicaments (e.g. underdevelopment, humanitarian challenges, drugs, and organized crime) and we are not able here to attend to all these as closely as they deserve. Still, this chapter aims to illustrate the intimate connection between social progress and the issues of violence, war, peace, and security. In this chapter we approach this, by first dealing with the origins and dynamics of violence and war (Section 10.2), followed by a treatment of matters relating to the building of peace and security (Section 10.3), after which we take up a set of overarching, general issues that affect both the previous sections (Section 10.4) followed by some remarks on implications for the future (Section 10.5). The time frame largely builds on the developments since the Second World War, and more specifically since the end of the Cold War.

10.1.1 Approach of this Chapter

In the classical social and political sciences, the analysis of war and political violence distinguishes between various forms of these phenomena. A treatise may concentrate on one or several levels, notably, individual, local, national, supranational, international, and world levels. This is a frequent framework that can be seen as a European legacy of the seventeenth century, often attributed to the Westphalian treaties following the Thirty Years War. It organized "the world" (in fact, only Europe) in states that related to each other through diplomacy and war, what today is termed "international relations." This led to or contributed to the principle of "methodological nationalism" as observed by Ulrich Beck (2002). The main patterns of thinking and examining political violence and war focused either on relations *within* the nation-state, or *between* nations. This has the advantage of making it possible to pursue international comparisons, for instance, between countries. When connected to the idea of state sovereignty, however, it meant that internal affairs were no longer the legitimate concern of other states.[8]

It is useful to distinguish various levels, from the individual to the world. At the same time we know that it is no longer enough, or fully satisfactory, since these levels constantly interact with each other, particularly in the contemporary world. Frequently, a local expression of violence cannot be understood if one doesn't take into account distant elements, either concretely or symbolically: if a Jewish institution is destroyed by an explosion in Latin America, it is may be an expression of local anti-Semitism, but such hatred could certainly be nurtured by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and by the Middle East situation, if not perpetuated by terrorists coming from the Middle East. The interaction may be a question of meaning, and it is then not concrete, but rather virtual, the fruit of the Internet and modern technologies of communication. This means, in line with Beck, that we should adopt a "cosmopolitan" perspective to understand important issues such as violence. He called this way of thinking "methodological cosmopolitanism:" a very local event should be analyzed taking into account non-local logics, such as world risks (Beck 2002).

But it is not only a question of more or less abstract meaning, the fruit of imagination of some actors, since many expressions of violence and war, today, develop simultaneously in a very concrete manner at different levels, and make impossible a simple use of "methodological nationalism." For instance, contemporary terrorism is frequently global, a mixture of both local and geopolitical dimensions. Radical Islamism often emerges in a society, with, for instance, post-colonial difficulties in integrating migrants, inequalities, racism, etc., on the one hand, and on the other hand, it may be organized far from this society, e.g. in the Middle East, by organizations such as al-Qaeda or IS, the Islamic State. In order to understand the terrorist attacks, for instance, in Paris (January and November 2015), Brussels (March 2016), Nice (July 2016), Stockholm, St. Petersburg, and London (April 2017), Manchester, UK (May 2017), Barcelona and Cambrils (August 2017), etc., one must take into account the individual trajectories of young people that were born in these countries, but also the existence of organizations based in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Caucasus, or other places where they may be planning local and international actions. These acts are both domestic and international. The patterns may be somewhat different from actions that we also have seen in the Middle East (including Turkey) and parts of Africa, where the recruitment pattern may differ, but still takes place within a context of cross-border actions. The classical, often legal, distinction between what is internal and what is external is not sufficient in order to understand this type of extreme violence. Of course, nation-states and their borders exist, and define a central level for analysis. But this is not the only level,

[8] The Westphalian Treaty of 1648, however, included provisions attempted at protecting civilians that did not share religion with the ruler, a first admission of human rights extending beyond sovereignty. This is often not mentioned in writings on this particular treaty. See Osiander (2001).



Figure 10.1 | Armed conflicts by intensity, 1946–2015.
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, reproduced with permission.

Box 10.1 | Armed Conflict

An *armed conflict* is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year. An armed conflict with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in a calendar year is a *war* (Uppsala Conflict Data Program www.ucdp.uu.se).

and in this chapter one must think globally, i.e. taking into account the various forms of articulation and interpenetration of levels that go from the more general and global to the more specific and individual or local.

10.2 Violence and War

10.2.1 Conflict Trends

There is considerable discussion on the trends in armed conflict. Steven Pinker's work *The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* received global attention when it appeared in 2011. Several other studies argued the same thing at about the same time (Gleditsch et al. 2013; Goldstein 2011; Norberg 2016; Väyrynen 2006).[9] Some evidence was based on data produced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), but the arguments for this decline in violence differed. Pinker referred largely to a civilizational change, building on the increasing capacity of the state to control violence. Others referred to the effectiveness of international organizations (Goldstein 2011), the democratization of societies (Gleditsch et al. 2013) and the declining attractiveness of violence as a political instrument (Mueller 1989). The data that spurred the arguments observed the decline in armed conflicts and wars over time, as well as decreasing destructiveness of the conflicts. In particular, the focus was on the periods since the end of the Second World War. The end of the Cold War has certainly also exerted an influence on armed conflicts.

The argumentation can be said to reflect an optimism that characterized a world of increasing globalization, universal economic growth, and strong improvements in health care. Five years later, the conclusions seemed premature, as armed conflicts again increased. This is what is demonstrated in the following two curves, drawn from UCDP using the definition in Box 10.1.

Figure 10.1 demonstrates that the trend, at the time of the debate and writings by Pinker, Goldstein, and Gleditsch had considerable face validity. They reflected a situation that seemingly could be observed and confirmed around the world. The wars appeared to be ending, either through comprehensive peace agreements (notably in Sudan and Indonesia, the Balkan wars were not restarting following the Dayton accords, etc.) or victories (Sri Lanka's armed forces decisively defeating the Tamil Tigers, in 2009). Barack Obama was elected president of the United States partly because of war fatigue in the United States. However, Figure 10.1 demonstrates the difficulty of making predictions: at about the same time as these observations were made new armed conflicts were brewing and soon changed the global outlook. In the years 2014–2015 Islamic jihadist groups made remarkable

[9] John Mueller (1989) was actually first to argue along these lines.



Figure 10.2 | Battle-related deaths in armed conflicts, 1989–2015.
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, reproduced with permission.

territorial gains (IS in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, other affiliates in Libya, Mali, Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia). The contours of a transnational coordinated movement based on military capacity and terrorist activity suggested a real challenge to the existing world order. More predictable, perhaps, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia began to strike back, not the least after terrorist attacks in Western Europe. By 2017 many of these groups were weakened, but still able to inflict considerable harm and much fear.

In this more unpredictable global situation, the actions by Russia in unilaterally occupying and annexing Crimea coupled with the military de facto control over other parts of Ukraine through various separatist groups, also demonstrated that the custodians of world order, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, could act outside Charter obligations without effectively being rebuffed. Indeed, a precedent had already been set by the US and UK invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, even earlier, in Kosovo 1999. The world order as it was known, found itself in crisis. Furthermore, the control by the state of means of violence was no longer necessarily something that promoted civilizational values, as "legitimate" weapons were used for repression, civil wars, and external interventions by Western powers but also in Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, and Myanmar. These were countries that only a few years earlier had been seen as examples of peaceful democratization. What they did drew international criticism, but international institutions had difficulties in garnering concerted reaction. These institutions were sidelined while democracy was retreating.[10]

As Figure 10.1 recounts the number of conflicts, also their destructiveness needs to be added to the picture. This is presented in Figure 10.2, which includes the battle-related deaths in the period since the end of the Cold War. Figure 10.2 confirms the picture that the world now faces challenges unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. Compared to the big wars of that period, e.g. the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iran-Iraq War, and the war in Afghanistan 1979–1989, these conflicts are still limited. However, the picture of a constant decline of wars has to be questioned. That picture may still be correct in a longer term, e.g. if one looks to decade-long changes. There is hope that the declining trend may return. But the challenges for the immediate future, e.g. the next 5 to 10 years is likely to be a traditional one: how to manage the threats of organized violence in such a way that the amount of violence is not increasing even more?

The statistics of Figures 10.1 and 10.2 are global. However, we have emphasized the importance of studying the phenomenon of violence at different levels. Some regions of the world show patterns that deviate from the global one, in important ways. There are reasons to consider too, in particular: South America and East Asia. Both of them demonstrate a remarkable reduction in armed conflicts during the past three or four decades.

South America has passed through a transition away from military rule to democratization of most of state leadership. The conflicts have largely been ended through peace processes, notably in Central America and Colombia (as recent as in 2016), or through a few victories (notably the defeat of the Maoist Sendero Luminoso in Peru). There are other problems of violence in this region, something we will return to in this chapter.

Furthermore, East Asia has not seen a major war since 1980, but has instead been the region of exemplary economic growth. Although democratization is less common, the character of repression may have changed in some of the countries, notably China where human rights are still continuously violated but without the types of massacres that we saw in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989 (Eck 2016). South Korea, Japan, the Philippines all seems solidly democratic. At the same time, however, the region includes a closed and unpredictable regime in North Korea. Also, the Communist Party of Vietnam has shown little interest in democratization. The uniting factor is, instead, an interest in economic growth and stability.[11]

This means that there are other regions that exhibit the largest extent of violence, particularly the Middle East. Thus, half of the deaths making up the 2015 number in Figure 10.2 refer to the internationalized civil war in Syria. Other countries with many war victims are Iraq, Libya,

[10] The 2017 Annual Report of the Varieties of Democracy Institute, Göteborg University, reported in May 2017 on the "global democratic backslide," pp. 8–9, https://issuu.com/ante/docs/v-dem_annualreport2017.

[11] See, for instance, Tønnesson (2015).



Figure 10.3 | Fatalities in one-sided violence, by type of actor, 1989–2016, with the outlier case of Rwanda indicated. Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, reproduced with permission.

and Yemen, all belonging to the Arab world, and countries close by, notably Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mali, Nigeria, Turkey, and Ukraine. The present dynamics of these conflicts suggest that they are likely to continue throughout this decade and perhaps beyond, in the same form as today or involving even more actors. Even if these wars were to end in one way or the other, the rehabilitation of the societies is likely to be a long-drawn-out development. The experience from peace negotiations suggests that agreement is a reasonable way to end conflict, but also that they are likely to be very protracted. For instance, the recent agreement in Colombia has taken 4 years, and this came after many other attempts during the last 40 years; the process on Guatemala took 7 years; and negotiations between Israel and Palestinian representatives have continued, off and on, for more than 25 years.

Furthermore, as these involve regional connections, the complications in reaching an agreement (as well as a victory) are many and intertwined with other issues. The restoration of peace in the Middle East requires extraordinary commitments of regional as well as global actors. For the time being, there is no such dedication, apart from achieving victory for the preferred parties or preventing the victory of their enemies. And one may think that the deficit of solid states in this part of the world will make sustainable peace difficult to implement.

10.2.2 One-Sided Violence and Civilian Victimization

There is a legitimate and increasing concern about the fate of civilians in political conflicts. The UN has approved the protection of civilians as a most important international concern whether in armed conflict or in other situations, notably genocide, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism. Figure 10.3 gives recent data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program on what is fruitfully termed one-sided violence for the post-Cold War period.

Figure 10.3 demonstrates the magnitude of the problem in terms of fatalities, as well as the variations over time. The case of Rwanda stands out at the most destructive event, in terms of human lives, since the end of the Cold War. It was largely government driven, and governments tend to be responsible for a considerable amount of such violence. However, the graphs also reveal that this is not the full story, and that various non-state actors are also capable to deliver considerable human destruction. Since 2012 that has been the dominant actor in one-sided violence. This leads this chapter to consider three types of violence: terrorism, genocide, and targeted killings.

10.2.2.1 The Issue of Terrorism

The field of organized violence does not only include the armed conflicts. There are also other categories. Some of them can be labeled one-sided, i.e. when a state or non-state actor deliberately targets civilians for explicit and political reasons. There are two forms that we need to consider. Here we deal with terrorism, and in the following section with genocide.

The notion of terrorism is of political, rather than academic, background. It dates back to the nineteenth century, as an elaboration of the term "terror" originally associated with the Jacobines of the French Revolution. The first interpreters and "students" of terrorist violence were revolutionary ideologues and their political opponents. Academic research on terrorism has only evolved since the 1970s. The analysis of terrorism in all its form is still not as advanced as one might expect, in view of its role in policy-making.[12]

The term is often used to label actions by others, and is only exceptionally part of the self-description of the actors. Many governments apply this term to classify their political and/or armed opponents, regardless of whether their actions fit with nationally or internationally acceptable

[12] For a recent assessment, see Englund and Stohl (2017).

Box 10.2 | Definitions of Terrorism

(1) Terrorism involves deliberate use or threat of violence against "soft" (non-combatant) targets, or intentionally indiscriminate violence, in the name of political, religious, or ideological goals, employed by non-state actors to intimidate, destabilize, and exercise pressure on the society and the state (Working Definition, applied here).[13]

(2) Terrorism is "any action ... that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act ... is to intimidate a population, or compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act" (High-Level Panel 2004: para. 164)

(3) Terrorism constitutes "Intentional acts of violence by non-state actors that satisfy at least two of the following three inclusion criteria:

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and
3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law (Global Terrorism Database)."

definitions. Thus, the term "terrorism" and "terrorists" largely belongs to the language of ordinary or political life, which easily results in confusion when used for scientific purposes (Wieviorka 1993).

From a conflict resolution point, labeling a party as "terrorist" leads to a strong normative statement, such as "you shall not negotiate with terrorists" – which actually may be a public posture while allowing for simultaneous, secret negotiations. The term is also used to call for unity behind one side. An example is the announcement by US President George W. Bush, Jr. on September 20, 2001: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Indeed, the post-September 11, 2001 term "war on terrorism" spurred further confusion, especially when it comes to distinctions between "terrorism," "war," "rebellion," and "insurgency," as well as between non-state terrorism and "state terror." There is still no formally agreed international legal definition at the UN level. A 2011 overview lists 260 different definitions of terrorism (Schmid 2011).

This does not mean, however, the identifying terrorism is an impossible task. While most experts acknowledge the highly context-specific nature of multiple forms and manifestations of terrorism, mainstream terrorism research is at least in agreement on terrorism as a violent tactic to achieve political goals, broadly defined to include sociopolitical, ideological, or religious motivations. It is important to stress that terrorism itself is not a society-building philosophy or religion, comparable for instance, to liberalism, socialism, nationalism, Christianity, Islam, or Hinduism. To both perpetrators and observers it is a deliberate choice of a tactical option, where there in fact are alternatives. For the victims, however, terrorism is a human disaster, involving death and destruction for purposes not understood or shared by victims.

A common thread in most definitions is that terrorism involves actions that aim at civilians and other "soft targets" (non-combatants in conflict areas, civilian-dressed soldiers at vacation spots, people at civilian workplaces, public transportation, restaurants, hotels, schools, markets, sporting and entertainment events, religious services, etc.). It is the immediate target of violence – civilians (non-combatants) – that distinguishes terroristic actions from armed attacks against national or foreign government military and security forces or the capturing of geographical points for strategic or tactical reason. However, what is labeled terrorist action could also refer to military targets. Early examples are from Beirut in 1983, when two terrorist attacks killed soldiers at the American Embassy and in the French "Drakkar" building; it was also the case with 9/11 in Washington, DC where Pentagon was a target.

This is what insurgency or guerrilla warfare is about. It is the duty of governments to provide safety for the general public, and thus a typical terrorist ambition is to demonstrate that the government is not capable to deliver its part of the social contract. Attacks against "soft targets" are also meant to serve as staged, dramatic news-setting events for communicating the terrorists' message as widely as possible through real-time information flows, thus, creating a broader sense of insecurity and putting pressure on the state (or a group of states, international organization, or the world at large).

These three definitional criteria of terrorism – (1) a tactic choice to achieve a political goal, (b) through the use or threat of violence against civilians, (3) employed as an asymmetrical, "violent communication" tool – are summed up in the Working Definition used in this chapter and presented in Box 10.2. Box 10.2 includes three different definitions that seem to be in frequent use.

Two of the definitions in Box 10.2 are general, whereas the third one from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is operational with clear definitions, where it is enough if two of the three criteria are met. It

[13] For more detail, see Stepanova (2008), pp. 5–13.



Figure 10.4 | Terrorist incidents worldwide, 1970–2015.
Source: Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd.

may make for a longer list of cases. Also it risks including situations that are not entirely comparable. Still, the data from GTD constitutes basic information for this section and is used in the following figures and tables.

The most serious objection to all three definitions in Box 10.2 is that they do not cover political violence by states (Schmid 2011: 86–87). State terrorism, thus, is left as a phenomenon of its own. It is not difficult to document that a number of governments pursue actions targeting civilians for political purposes, which thus also could be seen as terroristic in methods and intentions.[14] Another complaint is that these definitions can be applied under occupation and, thus, possibly, define what is legally accepted resistance against occupation as terrorism. This objection is often heard from representatives of Palestine or other Arab countries.

This has led to the development of the notion of "one-sided violence" by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, and that has been used in the heading above. When applied to situations of violence it becomes clear that states are highly responsible for a considerable share of such actions. Indeed, leaders of non-state actors targeting civilians often excuse this by referring to government actions. This is important, as there often is an interaction between the terror used by governments and by the armed opposition groups. Regimes based on terror often breed oppositional terror, which in turn may serve to reinforce the use of terror by regimes. This may result in seemingly never-ending action–reaction cycles, where both sides see the defeat of the other as the only way out.

As mentioned the data presented here stems from the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland (GTD). Figure 10.4 shows that the world in the mid-2010s finds itself at unprecedentedly high levels of terrorist actions. This is true for the period when statistics were available, i.e. since 1970. The year 2014 seems to have hit an all-time high. The number of terrorist incidents (16,840) and fatalities (32,765) exceeded those of the year 2000 by almost 10 times.[15] The year 2015 saw a minor decline in terrorist incidents and fatalities. Still, it was the second deadliest year on record.[16] The economic impact of these actions is not negligible.[17]

While no state is immune to violent extremism,[18] in the early twenty-first century much of global terrorist activity was concentrated to two regions – the Middle East and South Asia (Figure 10.5). In 2014, five countries were the scenes for 78 percent of all terrorism fatalities worldwide and for 57 percent of all terrorist attacks.[19] In 2000–2014, Western states saw 2.6 percent of all terrorist fatalities and 4.4 percent of terrorist attacks.[20] There was a decline in activity that might be attributed to the relative weakening of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Iraq and Boko Haram in Nigeria. We can note that many of these movements combine systematic use of terrorist means with active

[14] Early work on this was Stohl 1988.
[15] Ibid.
[16] With a global total of 14,806 terrorist incidents and 29,376 fatalities, 2015 was a 12 percent and 10 percent decline, respectively, from all-time peak numbers in 2014. See also the Global Terrorism Index (GTI 2016), p. 2 and Stohl (1988). Deterioration of the terrorism situation in several other countries resulted in the overall increase in Global Terrorism Index score for 2016 by 6 percent.
[17] In 2014, 16,818 terrorist attacks and 32,658 fatalities were registered, compared to 1,778 attacks and 3,329 fatalities in 2000. Economic damage reached USD 52.9 billion, compared to USD 4.93 billion in 2000 (GTI 2015: 2, 9, 63; GTI 2016).
[18] In 2014, terrorism affected 93 out of 162 countries as rated by the Global Terrorism Index.
[19] GTI 2015, p. 4.
[20] Ibid., p. 49.



Figure 10.5 | Terrorist attacks by region (top seven regions), 2000–2015.
Source: Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd.

combat, state-building ambitions, and social experiments in major armed conflicts, i.e. conflicts that have been mentioned in the previous section.

However, one of the main specifics of terrorism is that quantitative parameters do not fully reflect the political significance and impact of terrorist attacks. In the age of globalization and continuing rapid development of information and communication technologies, the capacity of violence to affect politics becomes more important than its actual scale and direct harm. For instance, destabilizing effect of terrorism on international politics and security largely depend on the comparative "centrality" of a specific context to global politics. Furthermore, in contrast to the trends in terrorism in its main regional centers, we can observe that after 2014, Europe in particular has seen the sharpest spike ever, with the largest increase in France and Turkey.[21] Attacks on centers of Western European centers gains global attention through international media and produce asymmetrical global resonances far exceeding the international effect from the more frequent and deadly attacks in, for instance, Baghdad, Kabul, Lahore, or Mogadishu.

There is today a large set of approaches to terrorism. It is not enough to say that it is a communication-oriented form of political violence, which is tailored to the information-intense post-industrial societies and their vulnerabilities, since its targets can be located in other societies. Some focus on select "root causes" considering that each form of terrorism is an outcome of certain combinations of factors – some of which may be more fundamental than others (Bjorgo 2005; Crenshaw 2010). They may differentiate between *structural*, or *macro-level drivers* (demographic imbalances, globalization, "traumatic" modernization and relative deprivation, transitional societies, social alienation, and marginalization of segments of the population), *facilitating factors* (symbiotic relationship between terrorism and mass media, advances in weapons and information technology, weak state control of territory, interconnections with crime), and the more direct and context-specific *motivational causes* (discrimination and other grievances among a subgroup, elite dissatisfaction, lack of opportunity for political participation, or human rights abuse). Some look for and combine, where appropriate, explanations *at different levels of social structure* – at the individual psycho-sociological level, the social group, societal (national), and systemic (international) levels.

An important dimension of terrorism is its relationship with any kind of meaning. In many cases, terrorism is more violent and unlimited when the actors speak artificially in the name of a people, a class, a Nation, when they act far from any real social or cultural group. This was the case, for instance, in the 1970s and the 1980s with extreme-left terrorists were acting on behalf of the working class, while real workers didn't recognize their demands in their murders. Today, Islamic terrorist frequently want to die, and not only to kill, and there are important debates among scholars in order to know what actually comes first: religion, including martyrdom; or radicalization due to social and cultural factors.[22] Sometimes, too, the relationship

[21] The OECD countries showed a 650 times increase in deaths from terrorism, from 77 in 2014 to 577 in 2015 (GTI 2016: 4).
[22] See, for instance, the debate between the two main French specialists, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy. Kepel considers religion to be the core of Islamic terrorism, while Roy is much more interested in the social making of radicalized people. See de Bellaigue (2017).

to meaning is so strange that scholars introduce psychiatric or psychoanalytical explanations (Benslama 2016).

This implies an important point for those that deal with the importance of finding ways of ending violence: if terrorism is such a complex phenomenon, then, excessively mono-dimensional and simple approaches will necessarily fail. For instance, war with IS may be considered as necessary in order to end Islamic terrorism in many countries, but it will not solve the psycho-sociological problems or the domestic sociological crisis that make martyrdom and extreme violence attractive to many young people in these countries.

Trends in contemporary terrorism include bottom-up processes of expansion of a militant-terrorist actor from the more local to the regional, transnational, and geopolitical levels. Some of today's most deadly militant-terrorist actors went through this trajectory. A prime example is the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), which started as a Sunni-based reaction to Shia control in Iraq, later entered the Syria civil war and then began drawing attraction across the Middle East (e.g. Libya and Sinai in Egypt) as well as attracting individuals in Western Europe, North Africa, and North America joining them due to logics of action mainly rooted in their own countries. Boko Haram in Nigeria began as a local revolt in Northern Nigeria and later reached out to other parts of Western Africa. Many of these radical movements combine terror with actual territorial control. Many aim at changes in the government of their own states, rather than inviting a confrontation with the West (unlike IS and al-Qaeda). For a period these movements entered into a loose alliance. As can be seen in Figure 10.5 some of these movements are involved in a large share of all terrorist deeds.

Some analysts see terrorism in the Western world as an emergence of small, self-generating militant-terrorist cells, autonomous "lone wolves." The main "glue" for such networks are universalist radical anti-system ideologies (in the early twenty-first century, at the global level this role has been played by ideology of "global jihad"). Fragmented cells and networks emerge and operate in many countries, and may be found among homegrown, but religiously inspired jihadist followers in the West. One must be careful with the notion of "lone wolves:" in most cases, the so called "lone wolf" of the first moments after a terrorist attack appears in further police and justice investigations, not to be so "lone."

One must also note that radical Islam doesn't have a monopoly on contemporary terrorism. There can be other religions with similar phenomena – Hinduism, for instance. And some actions may have nothing to do with religion, and instead be connected to nationalist ideologies, or extreme-right motivations. The concern over "foreign fighters" has been great in Western Europe, building on cases of individuals that are radicalized, move to IS-controlled territory and then return, ready to carry out terrorist acts in major centers. The centers of gravity for this circulation of militants seem to correspond to areas of protracted armed conflicts.

Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that the dynamic interaction of asymmetrical and communication functions of terrorism may also take unexpected forms, depart from established patterns and generate new types and manifestations of threats that are hard to predict or forecast. This means that the task of reducing terrorism cannot be confined to protection against expected terrorist threats only. It also requires identifying *structural weaknesses* of a sociopolitical system that is under terrorist threat(s) and increasing general political, ideological, social, and security resilience *of the system itself*, thus genuinely contributing to social progress.

To this can be added – as stated in the introduction of this chapter – another important point: if violence, particularly in its most extreme form such as terrorism, is more frequently the opposite to social movements, non-armed conflicts, i.e. to constructive change, then, the reduction of terrorism should be sought through re-inventing or re-launching of debates between actors able to talk and negotiate with each other. This could be true at all levels, including the transnational one, and this should combine different levels of action – something that is not easy to achieve.

10.2.2.2 One-Sided Violence: Mass Murder and Genocide

Coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin in order to analyze the crimes committed towards Armenians by the Turkish power, the massacres of Assyrians in Iraq in 1933 and the destruction of European Jews by the Nazis, the concept of genocide received international stature on December 9, 1948, when the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The parties to the convention state that genocide is a crime under international law that they "undertake to prevent and to punish" (Article I). It provides that genocide is a set of acts with the "intent to destroy, whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" (Article II). Thus, it is a strong commitment and, by now, all the Permanent Members of the Security Council have ratified this convention.

The study of genocide was not developed academically until the 1980s, with work by Helen Fein (1979) on the one hand and Ted Gurr and the Minorities and Risk project on the other (1993). Certainly, the pursuit of the Nazi criminals continued, but most energetically only by Israel, as demonstrated by the spectacular capture of Adolf Eichmann and the subsequent trial, or by some individuals such as Serge and Beate Klarsfeld, campaigning for instance in 1986 against Kurt Waldheim, a former officer in the Wehrmacht before becoming the Austrian's president. Still, the Cold War period (from 1955 to 1990) saw 33 events that met the definition of genocide (and politicide) according to data published by Barbara Harff (2003). However, the descriptions of the time were not in these terms. Events listed by Harff include genocides during the wars in Sudan, Vietnam, and Tibet, as well as mass persecutions in Iraq, Indonesia, and Cambodia. The leading actors of the Cold War, in a remarkable way, were not giving the same attention to the sufferings of peoples in the many conflicts that together constituted this global conflagration between East and West. Their strategic significance in the struggle was all that mattered. The issue was not about the human consequences but whether a victory would be to the benefit of the Soviet Union or the West (or China). This overriding question neglected the sufferings that were an integral part, indeed the necessary element, in the conflict: people were killed, starved, turned into

refugees, and succumbed to famine and epidemics. Outside powers poured weapons, soldiers, expertise, intelligence, and funding to "their" respective sides. The long-term argument was that "when our side wins" the conditions would be so much better for all, and that would outweigh all the suffering.

Thus, only with the end of the Cold War could the issue of genocide again take its appropriate place in academia and international politics. The experiences of Bosnia (1992–1995) and Rwanda (1994) again convincingly demonstrated the relevance of the notion of genocide and the fact that contemporary situations were covered by the genocide definition: There was the intention to actually eliminate/exterminate national, ethnical, racial and religious groups in whole or in part.

Harff 2017 provides an operation definition. It may be argued that her work from 2003 is still the most important study. Data provided by UCDP demonstrates that genocides with considerable civilian fatalities are not a daily occurrence, as is the case with other forms of violence. The graph in Figure 10.3 demonstrates this very strongly: Rwanda constitutes a distinctive event. Certainly, the wars over Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992–1995 have also had a genocidal character, particularly associated with the term "ethnic cleansing." This resulted in mass population movements within and across borders and severe human victimhood. As both these examples demonstrate, however, genocide is often linked to other political developments, notably armed conflicts (Wallensteen, Melander, and Möller 2012). The Rwandan genocide took place in the midst of a civil war and the massacre of young Muslims in Srebrenica was an element in an ongoing war in the region. Thus, a predictor of genocide may very well be the existence of an armed conflict in the first place. The origins of genocide are also touched in Section 10.2.3.8.

10.2.2.3 One-Sided Violence: Targeted Eliminations – Efficiency, Legality, and Ethics

Consolidated democratic government can also resort to actions that are close to the definitions of terror, targeting and killing particular individuals without the resort to customary rules of law. Targeted killing is "the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under color of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator" (UN Human Rights Council 2010: 3). Illustrated today by the strikes conducted – mostly by drones, by the United States and Israel, for example – on suspected terrorists, such a practice has triggered a virulent academic and public debate on at least two questions.

First, its efficiency: On the one hand, its opponents pretend it is ineffective because the person killed would be immediately replaced, because terrorist organizations are adapting, flattening their organization, less hierarchical, and centralized, therefore less vulnerable to decapitation, and because of the cost of the operation (one targeted killing at the right place and the right time necessitate a permanent deployment of intelligence, aircrafts, men, etc.). It would even be counterproductive, as it would trigger retaliation, create martyrs that strengthen cohesion of the adversary, make collateral damage that also reinforce its popular legitimacy and have a recruiting effect, and complicate peace negotiations.

On the other hand, its proponents respond that targeted persons are not that easily replaced, as leaders, recruiters, experts in explosives, etc., often have rare qualities and they are in limited numbers. Arresting or killing them disrupts the organization for a certain time. It is plausible to assume that the efficiency of the targeted killings therefore depend on their frequency: Frequent strikes allow no time for the organization to recruit and train, and are therefore more disrupting. Furthermore, retaliation is not systematic, does not always have the means to be very lethal, and is not always easy to distinguish from an attack that would have occurred anyway.

Second, its legality. In the context of an armed conflict, international humanitarian law (IHL) applies: Targeted killing may be legal if the target is a combatant or a civilian participating directly in hostilities, if it is necessary, proportional, and all precautions must be taken to minimize damage to civilians. In the absence of armed conflict, however, international human rights law applies and the state is allowed to kill only if necessary to protect life and if there is no other means, such as capture or neutralization, to prevent the threat. Targeted killing, in the sense of an intentional, premeditated and deliberate killing, is illegal because, unlike in wartime, in peacetime it is never allowed to have the sole purpose to kill.

Therefore, the crux of the matter is to know if the strikes – often drone strikes – are taking place in or outside the framework of an armed conflict. The problem of course, is that the definition of armed conflict is ambiguous, a declaration of war has never been a good indicator of a state of war, and the evolution of conflicts, particularly with the multiplication of transnational non-state armed groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram puts many situations into very grey areas, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter. If using the UCDP definition, as done here, many of these strikes may be found in the context of armed conflict, however.

Many states practice targeted killings but only two publicly acknowledge a targeted killings policy, Israel and the United States.[23] They have a similar normative framework, based on a rather extensive interpretation of self-defense, and criteria such as the primacy of capture, and respect for IHL. Their framework redefines imminence: someone who has already attacked, from which it can be assumed that he intends to attack again, and who has the ability to do so is considered an imminent threat. It is no longer necessary to have an even vague idea of the time, place, or nature of the attack: it is assumed that any alleged member of al-Qaeda is "continuously" planning an attack. A question is, however, how such a case can be brought to a court, where and with what consequences?

[23] In media and other accounts, certain regimes notably those in North Korea (a recent example is the lethal attack on Kim Jong Un's half-brother in the airport of Kuala Lumpur, March 2017) and Russia/Soviet Union; have been accused of conducting such actions outside their own territories, against individuals they fear.

10.2.3 Violence in Societies

10.2.3.1 Framework

Violence can be seen as a demonstration of *power* (Imbusch 2003). It can manifest as the violation or destruction of the physical and psychological integrity of killed or injured persons or groups, or in threat to or destruction of a social order. Violence is always also characterized by *ambiguity* (Heitmeyer and Hagan 2003) when it comes to defining the diversity of its expressions, in the sense of what different cultures define as violence. There is no equivocation, however, in the case of killing of people, whether by an individual murderer, political groups, or actors under state authority.

Social progress depends on reducing threatened and actual criminal, political, and state killings of individuals and groups. There is, however, a specific *ambivalence* of violence, especially in connection with social progress: for example, where the removal of a murderous social order by individual or collective violence leads to dramatic escalation in society and potentially even civil war. Any member of society may become a victim, above all weak groups and minorities. In this section we single out the type of violence that is not directly seen as political or organized for political purposes, such as armed conflicts and one-sided violence that we have dealt with in Sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2.

10.2.3.2 Human Development and Violence

Violent deaths can be disaggregated into three distinct forms: conflict-related, non-conflict-related, and suicides (UNODC 2013: 9). With non-conflict-related violence (Section 10.2.3.3) and suicide (Section 10.2.3.5) we focus on the most frequent instances. Conflict-related violence is the subject of other sections of this chapter. The approach in this section is to depart from the fact that countries can be categorized according to their level of human development (UNDP 2013). We combine such levels of development with different forms of violence to identify chances of social progress.

First, this means the *prevalence* of homicide in societies (Section 10.2.3.3) and cities (Section 10.2.3.4), suicide (Section 10.2.3.5), domestic violence (Section 10.2.3.6) school shootings (Section 10.2.3.7), violence against minorities (Section 10.2.3.8), organized crime and violence (Section 10.2.3.9), and right-wing violence (Section 10.2.3.10). The available datasets, maintained for example by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Bank, suffer various validity problems, especially in relation to the regions worst affected by crisis and violence.

Second, the extent of such violence is known to differ depending on the *social constellation*, in the sense of different *structural* levels of integration opportunities, living conditions, and danger to life. Several indices have been developed to enable international comparison of life chances. Economic development (GDP, GNI), human development (Human Development Index, HDI), and inequality (Gini coefficient) are prominent predictors of homicide rates (Nivette 2011: 117; Ouimet 2012: 239ff.; Pridemore 2011: 742ff.). The HDI was developed to counter a one-sided overemphasis on the economic, adding the categories of education and health to the economic dimension (GNI). It does not, however, address distribution within society (inequality).

That is achieved by the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which supplies the best available measurement of social development taking account of inequality (Peterson 2013). This is therefore the index used in the following to compare development levels with homicide rates, seeking a macro-sociological background for the explanation of deadly violence (Messner 2003: 701f.).

In the question of a connection between HDI and homicide rates, research has produced diverging findings. Most studies, however, confirm that homicides decline as development increases (Altheimer 2008: 110; Cao and Zhang 2015; Lee and Pridmore 2014: 114f.; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002; Nivette 2011: 118f.). The point of interest now is what happens to that relationship when application of the IHDI introduces the additional factor of inequality, which to our knowledge has never been examined.

Third, the various manifestations of violence occur in different *sociospatial contexts*, the places where people live (by choice or compulsion), with their respective integration opportunities and disintegration risks. Here, in the context of global urbanization, the focus is on urban areas, as this is where the greatest opportunities for social integration and hopes for a better life appear to exist. Whether such expectations can be fulfilled depends to a significant extent on the structural development of the country in which the urban area is located. For this reason, the IHDI is compared with the homicide rates of the most dangerous cities, in order to arrive at findings about level of development and living conditions.

Finally, the *limits* of such analyses must always be noted. These include a frequent lack of the long-term data required to identify social trends in structural development, rates of violence, and urban living conditions (Fearon 2011: 4). This also applies to change over time, for example when state violence increases or decreases after the political order changes, or a civil war breaks out or ends.

10.2.3.3 Human Development and Homicide Rates

The homicide rate is a reasonable indicator of the extent of violence in a society (Cao and Zhang 2015: 3; Marshall and Summers 2012: 39; Messner 2003: 701f.; Nivette 2011: 104 and 106; Ouimet 2012: 244; Smit, de Jong, and Bijleveld 2012: 5; UNODC 2013: 11). Among available datasets the WHO data enjoy great international recognition and are regarded as relatively valid (Cao and Zhang 2015: 8; Koeppel, Rhineberger-Dunn, and Mack 2015: 51; LaFree 1999: 133; Levchak 2016: 8; Messner et al. 2002: 383; Messner et al. 2011: 67), and will therefore serve as the principal basis for the following discussion.[24]

[24] WHO Global Health Observatory Homicide Estimates 2012.



Figure 10.6 | Scatterplot of homicide rate and IHDI, correlation −.816** (n = 65).
Note: ** Correlations significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Source: calculations by Kanis, Heitmeyer, and Biome; IKG/University of Bielefeld/Germany.

Table 10.1 | Homicide rate by development group (IHDI) (n = 132)

IHDI 2012		
Human development[a]	Number of countries	Mean homicide rate (WHO 2012) and standard deviation
Very high	19	1.2 (1.1)
High	17	2.8 (2.1)
Medium	29	8.5 (10.1)
Low	67	13.6 (15.8)
Total	132	9.3 (13.2)

[a] Based on HDI fixed cut-off values.

An initial exploration of the relationship between IHDI and homicide rate in a sample of 65 countries found a significant correlation of −.816 (Figure 10.6).[25] Noteworthy is the much higher variation in homicides within the group of countries with a low IHDI. Contrary this exhibits a considerable convergence in homicide rates as the inequality-adjusted human development increases.

When inequality is taken into consideration, it is found that the mean homicide rate decreases as level of development (IHDI) increases (see Table 10.1).[26] The value in the least developed group is 11 times that of the most developed.

Moving on, the IHDI allows us to investigate the loss of development attributable to inequality, finding almost all the countries with the greatest losses to be in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 33 countries concerned, only 5 are outside that region.[27] The mean homicide rate in these countries is 12.1 (SD 8.3), more than six times the rate for countries with the smallest losses.

In this context, social progress – especially for the younger generation – occurs where there is an absence of temporary or permanent experiences of disintegration (manifested above all in social inequality, poverty, poor educational opportunities, and lack of health care). The dangers of social disintegration consist in interpersonal violence offering an option for changing personal and/or group-specific living conditions. Another relevant factor is the way new means of communication enable social comparisons to be made, in the sense of learning how young people are able to live in societies with higher levels of development. The other alternative is to direct violence against the self. These two forms of violence find their strongest expression in homicide, respectively suicide.

To put this into perspective, 79 percent of all homicide victims and 95 percent of all perpetrators are male (UNODC 2013: 13). The high proportion of male perpetrators is consistent across all countries. The proportion of female victims is correspondingly smaller at 21 percent, of which the 15–29 age group accounts for 8 percent (UNODC 2013: 14). Another mentionable difference between men and women is the context in which homicides occur. While men are mostly killed in public spaces and by unknown perpetrators almost half of all female homicide victims are murdered by intimate partners or family members (UNODC 2013: 14).

[25] Spearman on grounds of lack of normal distribution of variables (Pearson with logarithmic homicide rate shows a similar result of −.770). Estimates based on homicides from vital registration and criminal justice data (WHO 2014a: 62ff.).

[26] Note: The following statistics employ WHO homicide rates with adjusted and model-based estimates to cover more nations (WHO 2014a: 62ff.). While it is not advisable to use these types of estimates for inferential analysis it is feasible to use them for description. Nonetheless, model-based estimates should be interpreted with caution (Kanis et al. 2017).

[27] Based on IHDI quartiles.

Table 10.2 | Homicide victims, rate by age group and sex

Homicide victims: rate per 100,000 population		
Age group	Male	Female
0–14	2.0	1.9
15–29	16.7	3.8
30–44	14.4	3.1
45–60	8.6	2.1
60+	5.6	2.4
Total	9.7	2.7

Source: UNODC 2013: 28ff.

The young are over-represented among homicide victims: Homicide rates are highest within the age group 15–29 (Table 10.2). Given the global population distribution, 43 percent of the victims are aged 15–29, while including victims aged under 15 increases the figure to 51 percent (UNODC 2013: 14). Thus in 2012 more than half of the 437,000 homicide victims were children, adolescents or young adults (UNODC 2013: 11). It must always be remembered that survivors experience temporary or permanent physical and/or psychological harm that negatively affects their prospects of social integration.

While victims can be distinguished by demography, differentiation is not possible for questions of involvement in crime or gangs, or status as victim of politically, ethnically, or religiously motivated violence. The data for perpetuators is even more deficient (UNODC 2014: 91).

As already noted, 43 percent of homicide victims are aged 15–29. In combination with the high homicide rates in Central and South America, this means that about 14 percent of all male homicide victims worldwide are persons aged 15–29 in that region (UNODC 2013: 13). The reasons for this are gang-related crime, narcotics trafficking and drug consumption (including alcohol), post-conflict situations, and the availability of arms, anchored in a societal culture of violence (Cao and Zhang 2015: 6; Cole and Gramajo 2009: 766; Del Felice 2008: 83f.; Neapolitan 1994: 5f.; Waldmann 2007: 62ff.). Networking between organized crime, politics, and elites exacerbates the situation, while capital generated by criminal violence flows into charitable causes, undermining state structures (Rodgers and Jones 2009: 7). Deadly violence becomes a "successful" business model. In some contexts, like in Mexico, this model has been more prevalent while the state appeared increasingly weaker and more corrupt. Violence, in some Latin American countries, was highly political in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, it is now highly criminal. More generally, war and terror may include or open the way to more classical criminal violence, connected, for instance, to drug traffic.

10.2.3.4 Homicide Rates and Urbanization

While 43 percent of the global population lived in cities by the 1990s, the proportion rose to 54 percent by 2015 (UN-Habitat 2016: 6). The UN forecasts that by 2050, 66 percent of the world's population will be urban (UN 2015c: 1). This lends the urban living environment special importance for the question of social development. Cities form magnets – especially for young people willing to migrate – where social integration (or at least temporary integration into the labor market) secures the individual's economic reproduction and social recognition.

There does not appear to be any clear connection between urbanization and homicide rates. Most of the studies that have investigated this question find neither a positive nor a negative link (Levchak 2016: 5). There is discussion as to whether the growth process is a more relevant factor than the level of urbanization, in the sense of rural–urban migration driving the urbanization process generating competition for resources and greater anonymity – and with it increased willingness to pursue criminality (Cole and Gramajo 2009: 754). Such urban environments can thus become both attractive and dangerous when integration mechanisms fail to function. This creates a source of violence, especially by young men, in particular where culturally anchored norms of masculinity exclude failure.

The tension between the attraction of supposedly diverse opportunities in highly differentiated urban areas and frequently empty promises of a better life by legal means creates the breeding ground for aggression, where individual criminal violence and collective deadly violence represent significant options. The role of education, especially where migrants originate from rural areas, and ever-present comparisons with lives and possibilities in other parts of the world conveyed via the new media represent important background conditions.

Relating the major cities with the highest homicide rates (CCSPJP 2016: 3f.) to the findings using the IHDI concept, it is found that 13 of the 15 most dangerous cities in the 2015 ranking are geographically located in Central and South America (Figure 10.7). With the exception of the United States, all these cities are located in countries with a low level of development, according to the IHDI concept.

10.2.3.5 Suicide in Social Contexts

Suicide has to be seen in the societal and social context with a broad spectrum of risk factors. The WHO Report (2014b: 31) shows this including mental disorder as one factor. Even before homicide, suicide is one of the most frequent causes of death among adolescents and young adults (WHO 2014b: 3). The following descriptions are derived from WHO (2014b) suicide data for 130 nations.[28] Groups of countries can be categorized as follows: *very high* and *high* development 18 nations each, *medium* development 28, *low* development 66.[29] The total number of suicides in 2012 is estimated at 804,000 ((WHO 2014b: 7), with the number of attempts put 20 times higher ((WHO 2014b: 9). Globally, young men are more likely to kill themselves than women of the same age. Considering the values for both genders for the 15–29 age group, the suicide rate for males (14.5) is almost three times higher than for females (5.3). Within the same age group the values for males are relatively evenly distributed across development levels ranging from 13.5 to 16.0 and an average of 14.7. The female rate is less clear-cut with suicide rates ranging from 3.5 to 6.6 across development categories. It

[28] The WHO report lists 172 countries. Due to deletion of cases no HDI/IHDI value is available for the count reduces to 130.

[29] Based on HDI fixed cut-off values.



Figure 10.7 | The 15 most dangerous cities, 2015.
Source: CCSPJP 2016.

is notable that the rate in less developed nations (6.6) is almost twice the rate for high developed countries (3.5). However, a general pattern is not identifiable, since the second highest rate is found in the very high developed nations. That is not so for the general suicide rate (10.0), which is noticeably higher in countries with high (15.9) or very high (12.8) development than in countries with medium (9.7) or low (7.7) development. In comparison with the homicide rate, it is of interest that this finding shows the opposite relationship to IHDI level.

Although the number of suicides is estimated to be almost twice that of homicides, it is less suited as an indicator of violence. As a rule, the recording of suicide is more complex. In certain countries suicide is illegal or taboo, leading to its prevalence being underestimated, especially in countries where registration is incomplete (WHO 2014b: 7). As complex as the recording are the explanations for suicide, with causes ranging from geographical to biological, psychological, and sociocultural factors. The figures for suicide rates clearly illustrate that high development and relatively low inequality are not the same as the absence of violence (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).

10.2.3.6 Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is a complex phenomenon. It includes child maltreatment, violence in intimate relationships, homicide of intimates, elder abuse, etc. It is known that violence in intimate relationships is extensive and not limited to one socioeconomic group, one society, one culture, or one time period. Researchers have found violence and abuse in every type of intimate relationship (Gelles 2003). The question of the extent of family violence has not been easy to answer and still leads to contentious debates over the scientific adequacy and rigor of incidence and prevalence estimates (Sommers 1994).

There are several social risk factors to take into account. One of the most consistent is the age of offenders. Violence is most likely to be perpetrated by those between 18 and 30 years of age. As is the case with non-intimate violence, the offenders in acts of intimate violence are generally male. Although most poor parents and partners do not use violence toward intimates, self-report surveys and official report data find that the rates of all forms of family violence, except sexual abuse, are higher for those whose family incomes are below the poverty line than for those above the poverty line (Gelles 2003: 850).

The situational and environmental factors related to violence include stress, unemployment, being a teenage mother, and sexual difficulties. Additional factors include social isolation and a lack of social support (Gelles and Straus 1988). A special problem is the intergenerational transmission of violence (Kaufman and Zigler 1987).



Figure 10.8 | Rampage school shootings worldwide by decade.
Source: Böckler et al. 2013: 10.

One of the most important risk factors for violence against women is gender inequality. Individual, aggregate, and cross-cultural data find that the greater the degree of gender inequality in a relationship, community, and society, the higher the rates of violence toward women (Browne and Williams 1993; Levinson 1989; Morley 1994).

10.2.3.7 School Shootings in the Spectrum of Multiple Homicides

Holmes and Holmes (1998) distinguished three basic categories of multiple homicide: serial killings, spree killings, and mass murders. Rampage killings are a subcategory of mass murder. School shootings are mostly committed by adolescent perpetrators and occur at school or in a school-related place. They wish to take revenge on the community, or to experience or demonstrate power (Sweatt et al. 2002; Newman et al. 2004).

The frequency of the phenomenon has clearly increased over the past decades (Figure 10.8).

In terms of geographical distribution, by the end of 2011 the US total had reached 76 (63 percent of all recorded cases) while there had been 44 cases in the rest of the world (37 percent). It is conspicuous that school shootings occur predominantly in highly developed industrial countries; the three with the highest totals, the United States, Germany, and Canada, are among the world's most economically prosperous nations.

That leads to the question of explanations. Several theories seek to explain the phenomenon: Social Disintegration Theory stresses the lack of recognition (Böckler et al. 2013; Heitmeyer and Anhut 2008), while others focus on the role of the media (Muschert and Ragnedda 2011; Muschert and Sumiala 2012), the Strain Theory (Levin and Madfis 2012), or the adolescent culture (Newman et al. 2004). Muschert (2007) notes that school shooting incidents need to be understood as resulting from a constellation of contributing causes.[30]

10.2.3.8 Group-Focused Enmity, Hate Speech, and Violence Against Minorities

Violence against minorities is a cause of great worldwide tragedies (Gurr 1993; Gurr and Pitsch 2003). It affects people without distinction of age and gender. The continuum of escalation begins with *Group-Focused Enmity* (Heitmeyer 2002; Zick, Küpper, and Heitmeyer 2009), under which people become targets for devaluation, discrimination, and violence purely on the basis of their chosen or externally attributed group membership, without heed to individual behavior. The legitimacy of this form of violence derives from the ideology of unequal worth (Heitmeyer 2002), which asserts a categorization into superior majority population and inferior minority population according to "racial," ethnic, gender-based, sexual, political, and/or social attributes. The associated hate crime is widespread (Hall et al. 2015) and the role of religion in conflicts has received increased attention since the late 1990s (Fox, James, and Yitan 2009). Concerning sexual and gender-based-violence, see Section 10.2.4.

Violence against minorities always involves power interests of the majority population and its intellectual and political elites. It is fostered by attitudes of Group-Focused Enmity, which serve to legitimize violent political, ethnic, and religious extremist groups, as well as state institutions such as the police and paramilitary units.

The global situation concerning violence against minorities is unclear and it is impossible to assemble a credible empirical overview. All that can be said comparatively is that violence is greatest in those countries where the group divisions are made visible (salient) by the media and by political and intellectual elites. This violence against minorities is further encouraged where those in power succeed in initiating "either/or" conflicts where there are no compromises or negotiated solutions, but only a dichotomous choice between victory and defeat (or destruction).

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) publishes regular reports on developments concerning hate crimes and mass killings. Reservations

[30] See also Paton (2015), constituting innovative research based on materials extracted from YouTube.

over the validity of data – estimates in particular, although official figures must also be viewed critically – apply here too (Kanis et al. 2017). These reservations notwithstanding, we note that in 2014 a very large number of minorities in 70 countries were threatened by hate crime, violence, and mass killing (Lattimer 2014). The worst-rated countries in 2014 included Somalia, Sudan, Syria, DR Congo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Myanmar, Ethiopia, and Yemen. At the same time, political developments cause shifts in the rankings; in 2015 the situation worsened in the Russian Federation, Libya, Egypt, Ukraine, and China (Lattimer and Verbakel 2015).

Particular dangers are faced by ethnic minorities that are not recognized as such by the state in which they live. For example, the heavily persecuted Rohingya minority in Myanmar is not on that country's official list of 135 ethnic groups, and lacks specific protection against the police and the army. A different quality of threat arises through authoritarian regimes that feel their power is threatened by minorities, such as China and the Muslim Uigurs or Russia against minorities in the Caucasus region. But these problems also exist in democratic systems where state institutions such as the police act violently against the black population, for instance in the United States.

Another threat constellation against minorities is characterized by violence exercised by non-state groups (under the eyes of state institutions), for example when nationalist Hindus in India take violent action against the Muslim minority. Minorities in many countries will face increasing violence. This also applies to the people involved in the global refugee movements, whose future extent we can only guess at. A huge problem is the reduced effectiveness of international law, which could continue to decline to dangerously low levels if further states, in particular African states with high levels of violence, choose to withdraw from the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

10.2.3.9 Organized Crime and Violence in the Context of Migration and Development

Global migration has increased drastically. The United Nations (2016, 1) reported that the total number of migrants grew from 200 million in 2000 to 244 million in 2015. Migration flows exist in several regions of the world, have different causes, and generate diverse variations of individual and especially organized crime and violence.

In the Middle East (e.g. Syria, Iraq, Libya) a migration flow has emerged as a result of civil wars and armed conflicts forcing refugees and asylum seekers to migrate to neighboring countries and Europe. In Africa, in countries like Somalia, Nigeria, Congo, and Chad (Grawert 2008), civil wars and failed or weak states combine with low levels of development (Whitaker 2003). The main destination for migration is the North. Migrations in the Americas are often based on the consequences of civil wars (e.g. El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala) or drug wars, e.g. Mexico or Columbia (Cantor 2014; Durand and Massey 2010; Ramírez-de-Garay 2016).

All the constellations generate different forms of crime and organized violence in the several settings: youth gangs like the Maras in El Salvador; organized drug violence, for example, in Mexico or Columbia; violent criminal networks of human traffickers who organize the migration flows from the Middle East and North Africa (and Afghanistan or Pakistan) to Europe. There are also organized, violent xenophobic and racist groups in the arrival countries, e.g. the United States, Germany, and Hungary.

While there is well-developed research on the migration-development nexus (e.g. De Haas 2012; Faist 2008; Faist, Fauser, and Kivisto, 2011), there still seems to be a deficit concerning the integration of violence research in this setting. Future research needs to incorporate the IHDI measure (see Section 10.2.3.3) as well as the homicide-urbanization link (see Section 10.2.3.4). Additionally, there is an alarming research gap concerning women and children as victims of violence in the global migration flows.

10.2.3.10 Violence by Right-Wing Extremist Groups

Right-wing extremism (political parties and movements and right-wing extremist violence) not only represents a growing threat of ideological targeting of groups (Group-Focused Enmity), it also is threatening democracies, liberal values, and the chances of social progress.

A broad spectrum of organized groups exists in Europe (see Figure 10.9) in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany, in the eastern parts of Europe, and in Russia, as well as violent militias in the United States. The events of Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017 seem to have surprised the American public at large and led to a feeble response from the US President.

A violent form of right-wing extremism is more likely to develop where there is no political representation through political parties (Koopmans 1996). The greater the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing extremist groups, the lower the political weight attributed to legitimate power-sharing – one should nevertheless note that some extreme-right parties try to avoid any kind of violence that could affect their respectability. The French Front National, for instance, neither uses nor supports violence.

There are different theoretical approaches to explain this phenomenon. Social-psychological approaches emphasize the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno 1950) or Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981) to establish the ingroup–outgroup relationship. Movement Theory concepts try to explain why a collective action comes about (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996). Deprivation Theory emphasizes the degree of disadvantage in society (Gurr 1972) as a result of social inequality. Political Culture Theory targets the attraction or failure of the democratic system, corresponding opportunities for participation, and state benefits (Sprinzak 1995). Modernization Theory approaches take as their starting point the dynamics of integration and disintegration (Anhut and Heitmeyer 2000; Wieviorka 1999).

Concerning the further development of right-wing extremist violence there is an obvious need to observe what happens with the movement of refugees to Europe.



Figure 10.9 | Right-wing terrorism and violence (RTV) killing incidents across Western Europe, 1990–2015 (n = 190).
Source: Ravndal (2016: 9).

10.2.3.11 Conclusion: Social Progress and the Chance of the Future Generations

Identifying favorable conditions for social progress and thus reductions in deadly violence against individuals and groups – in order to enable social and political intervention – now depends on the theoretical framing.

One starting point is the *dynamics of integration and disintegration processes* in societies with different levels of integration concerning social inequality, education, health, etc. With respect to social progress, especially for the younger generation, *Social Disintegration Theory* (SDT) (Heitmeyer and Anhut 2008) emphasizes opportunities for *reproduction* (access to employment and housing), *socialization* (individual and group access to public and political life), and *communitization* in the sense of developing personal and group identity. Where these opportunities are lacking, the probability of disintegration rises, and with it deficits in recognition that can in turn lead to violence. The dynamics of integration and disintegration processes are always also permeated by cultural and religious tradition and ethnic composition, and embedded in constellations of power and authority.

In terms of social progress and the associated decrease in violence, the societal challenges faced by political decision makers and civil society actors are extraordinarily diverse. These include preventing or minimizing an accumulation of increasing inequality and poverty, which also represent indications of social disintegration. To the extent that the data showing global poverty are declining statistically (UN 2015b: 4) are correct (for criticisms see Klasen 2013; Reddy and Lahoti 2016), average figures for social progress and social integration are not very helpful; the IHDI concept identifies numerous societies where a low level of development is associated with high levels of violence.

This raises the question of which type of political regime impedes social progress, notably to the disadvantage of the young generation, while at the same time promoting the attraction of violence.

This applies especially in relation to *demographic developments* in societies of the Global South, where often rapidly growing young populations – for example, in Arab societies – find few legal chances for social integration and thus recognition, or none at all. Frequently the only means left for them to secure an existence is crime and violence or internal mass migration to the big cities (where their perspectives are also often uncertain), or increasing international migration from South to North – as currently occurring not only from civil war regions to Europe – in order to be able to live a decent life. This generates new conflicts, in some cases adopting violent forms. It is also an open question whether the European cities will continue to function as "integration machines."

10.2.4 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Sexual and gender-based violence during conflict (or "conflict-related sexual violence"),[31] has become a new focus of social science research across a range of traditions, as well as international action by the

[31] "Gender-based" violence is not always conflict-related sexual violence, though the terms are often conflated. Gender-based violence is defined by the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation 19 to the Convention for the Elimination of Women. It is considered a fundamental violation of women's human rights, *because* they are women (CEDAW 2006). It includes physical, emotional, economic, political, and psychological harms. It can occur in the form of a direct act, as well as by omission. The term is used in both peace and conflict settings (see CEDAW 2006 paras. 1–4). However, in this chapter, the concurrent use of

United Nations (UN) and regional organizations and human rights and women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While addressing the problem of impunity through international law[32] and UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010) has made visible this once "invisible" feature of war, global attention in terms of peace and security has also led to new insights. First, conceptual challenges have arisen. It is no longer enough to say that gender inequality or patriarchal norms are the primary explanation for variation in the perpetrators, motives, frequency, scale, or type of abuses during conflict. Perpetrator groups do not only select victims because of their gender. And, men are also victims. Second, this violence is not always a "weapon of war." Sometimes it is not organized or strategic (Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009, 2013; Henry 2016; Hoover Green 2016; Marks 2013; Muvumba Sellström 2015a, 2015b; Wood 2006, 2009, 2010, 2014). There are important variations in the commission and therefore causes of these assaults, with a few actors carrying out the majority of atrocities (Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014; Muvumba Sellström 2015a). New research shows how some actors prevent their fighters from committing conflict-related sexual violence (Hoover Green 2016; Lieby 2009; Muvumba Sellström 2015a, 2015b).

Describing these harms has grown increasingly complex. Sexual violence includes rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other similar act of comparable gravity, as defined by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UNGA 1998). Abuses and assaults of a sexual nature can cover a wide range of phenomena (Wood 2006, 2009, 2010, 2014) in many different combinations, in the midst of war, as well as in militarized post-conflict settings (Muvumba Sellström 2015a). The relationship between gender-based violence, such as intimate partner abuse, and conflict-related violence is mainly anecdotal. The patterns can differ dramatically between war and peace (Wood 2014). It has therefore become helpful to focus on wartime acts and delineate the conflict-basis for these deeds from peacetime. For instance (and not without controversy), the UN's use of the term "conflict-related sexual violence" maintains an explicit basis in terrorism; organized, political armed violence; or war where assaults are "directly or indirectly linked (temporally, geographically or causally) to a conflict" (UN SG 2016: 1).

Gender is not always the main criteria for selection for conflict-related sexual violence. Victims are chosen because of other categories, such as political affiliation, ethnicity, religion, or geographic origins. In Rwanda, between 250,000 and 500,000 ethnic Tutsis and Hutu moderate women were raped (Binaifer 1996; UN Commission on Human Rights 1996). Certainly, their gender was the ground for targeting, but it was not a sufficient reason for their ill-treatment. Victims had to be "constructed" as representing the rival interests of, or as a threat to the identity of Hutu extremist perpetrators. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria has committed systematic abduction and sexual slavery. Ethnic or religious minority women and girls have been kidnapped to serve as sexual slaves for ISIL fighters (UN Secretary-General 2016). While these abuses are gendered – the Islamic extremist group used women's bodies as a form of currency to pay its fighters – ISIL's agenda was genocidal and it "intended to destroy the Yazidis of Sinjar, composing the majority of the world's Yazidi population, in whole or in part" (UN Human Rights Council 2016: 1). Such systematization lends conflict-related sexual violence to formulation as a gendered "weapon of war" (Quinn Thomas and Ralph 1994).

Of late, feminist scholarship has motivated for the use of gender as an analytical tool for disaggregating patterns in sexual violence. Davies and True (2015) contend that it is not only a matter of gender as a unitary, single [or binary] variable, but a question of relations, motivations, and processes that are predicated on how power is accrued, shared, and contested. As such, wartime sexual violence should be analyzed within a gender paradigm, if only to better assess its tactical use for political gains (see Cockburn 2010; Davies and True 2015). For instance, it is not yet clear how perpetrator attitudes about who can be victimized and what sorts of acts are permissible, shape their actions. Nor have social scientists settled questions about to what extent different degrees of discrimination and their social practice in peacetime correspond to particular patterns of violence during conflict. Indeed, the heterogeneous nature of beliefs and practices, which may also be contingent on interests and notions of class, ethnicity, and religion, will always challenge social science orthodoxies that seek to explain sexual and gender-based violence. These other factors create fluidity and at least at the individual level, deepen the complexity of the causal dynamics at play.

For now, there is no scientific consensus that gender inequality generates sexual violence in all conditions (Cohen 2013; Gottschall 2004; Wood 2014). Even when they have been exposed to similar gendered practices, with the same social construction of masculinity, marriage and sex, practices of sexual violence vary (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009, 2013; Muvumba Sellström 2015a, 2015b; Wood 2014). This problematizes the weapon-of-war framework (see, for example, Buss 2009; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009, 2013; Kirby 2013). Wood demonstrated that wartime sexual violence is puzzlingly varied (2006, 2009, 2010, 2014). Research by Lieby (2009) on the Guatemalan and Peruvian civil wars and Hoover Green's (2011) study of El Salvador has also drawn out additional evidence. Although this approach fails to capture the way that different power relations influence the political nature of this violence, and thus its gendered hue, it nonetheless offers a useful entry point into understanding the variation of sexual violence in conflict.

The *pre-conflict* phase may include a range of acts that include gender-based psychological and physical abuses. However, systematic scholarly investigation of temporal variation in sexual violence remains limited.

the terms "gender-based" and "sexual" is limited or used explicitly. In general, the emphasis of this section is on sexual crimes committed in conflict settings, which may also be directed at males and are direct acts.

[32] The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued a historic conviction for rape and sexual violence as a serious crime of genocide (*Prosecutor* v. *Akayesu* 1998). Article 7 of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (ICC) names widespread or systematic sexual violence as a crime against humanity (UNGA 1998: para. 1g). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) further expanded the scope for conviction for sexual violence from rape to include sexual torture, enslavement and various forms of penetration (*Prosecutor* v. *Dragoljub Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic* 2001).

In general, pre-conflict sexual violence may be obscured. Observers may call it intimate partner abuse, or civilian rape. Violence that takes place behind closed doors may not be accounted for as conflict-related. Theoretically, intimate partner abuse may arise because of increased militarization and recruitment. Perpetrators might target victims along ethnic or political fault lines.

Violence against men may require special attention and monitoring of prisons, particularly before more open armed hostilities. Sexual violence acts against men and boys are an empirical reality in all phases of conflict (Ferrales, Brehm, and Mcelrath 2016; Jakobsen 2014). Sexual violence against males has occurred in ancient wars, in every region of the world, and in many of the conflicts of the past and present centuries (Sivakumaran 2007). However, attacks of males are too often equated with torture, which can feature in pre-conflict repression by the state. Though they may be under-reported as "tortured" (Lieby 2012), male victims are anally raped, forcibly sterilized, beaten on their genitals, forced to masturbate before their abusers or other victims, and forced to remain naked. Any combination of these acts can also occur (Sivakumaran 2007).

Evidently, not all armed political actors commit widespread sexual violence *during conflict* (Wood 2006, 2009, 2010, 2014). Cohen and Nordås collected reports of sexual violence prevalence, covering 129 active conflicts, involving 625 armed actors for the period 1989–2009, in the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset. They found that 43 percent of individual conflicts had no reports of this violence (Cohen and Nordås 2014). Even in wars that could feature systematic conflict-related sexual violence, some actors may diverge from the weapon-of-war narrative.

To exemplify, in 2004, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-Forces for National Liberation (FNL) was rarely associated with wartime rape or similar abuses (Muvumba Sellström 2015a) during or after the civil war in Burundi. The lack of sexual violence is particularly striking if we consider that the coinciding and bordering genocide in Rwanda, between similar "ethnic" groups and root causes of conflict, included widespread sexual violence against Tutsis committed by the Hutu militia group known as *Interahamwe*. Palipehutu-FNL and *Interahamwe* each aimed to defeat their respective Tutsi minorities. Both attacked Tutsi civilians. Yet, FNL did not permit or order sexual violence.

Post-conflict sexual violence is also varied, though research on this particular phase is also limited. As during conflict, few actors commit the majority of acts. Muvumba Sellström's (2015a) events-based dataset between 1989 and 2011, of 23 armed actors who concluded their conflicts with a negotiated settlement in sub-Saharan Africa, shows that only a minority of actors (eight) was responsible for the majority (68 percent) of abuse. However, the type of assaults was also complex. Many of the 137 events involved more than one type of sexual violence. Approximately 30 combinations of violence were identified, ranging from single incidents of rape, gang rape, mass rape, sexual slavery, torture, harm to children, or combinations of these. About 44 percent of post-settlement sexual violence events had an unknown number of victims. However, there did appear to be a downward trend, with the armed actors in the study reducing their levels of sexual violence within the three years after settlement of their conflict.

Research has further sought to explain the willingness of armed actors to control the behavior of their combatants. Such studies entail cross-national and case study examination of the institutional (or organizational, see Wood 2014) conditions that contribute to sexual brutality by soldiers (Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell 2007; Cohen 2013; Lieby 2009; Nordås 2012). Wood's (2006, 2009) study of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka underscored Butler et al.'s (2007) contribution, which introduced the control of sexual violence as a principal-agent-problem. Wood highlighted the role of strong hierarchal structures and disciplinary practices through the chain of command. Hoover Green's (2011) examination of the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) in El Salvador interprets the principal-agent problem (Butler et al. 2007) as the "commander's dilemma," whereby leaders have to control their fighters while simultaneously inculcating their fighters with a will to kill for the cause (Hoover Green 2016: 621–622). One solution is standard operating procedures (more often found among state actors), and de-legitimization of problematic values. This echoes Butler et al.'s (2007) conclusion that breakdowns in institutional bureaucratic oversight among state agents will increase abuses.

A robust code clarifies Palipehutu-FNL's behavior. It instituted a prohibition on sexual violence and leveled the death penalty, applicable throughout the chain of command. Leaders indoctrinated followers during group prayers and trainings, ritualized good conduct through naming and shaming, and fostered peer pressure (Muvumba Sellström 2015a). Sexual violence was depicted as amoral and an act of weakness. This is in contrast to its rival rebel group, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), which never instituted clear and constant codes of conduct against sexual violence. While FNL had a lower rate of sexual violence, CNDD-FDD, even as the ruling, governing party in the post-conflict period, was responsible for intense levels of sexual and gender-based violence (Muvumba Sellström 2015a).

However, as with gender inequality, the lack of institutional prohibitions may not be a sufficient explanation (see also Henry 2016). Wood proposes that ideology is an understudied and important basis for an armed group's likelihood to prevent abuse (Gutiérrez and Wood 2014; Wood 2015). Hoover Green (2011) suggests that actors espousing a Communist vision for society are amenable to discipline. Peace and conflict research indicates that economic endowments (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Weinstein 2006) might explain the permissiveness of indiscriminate sexual abuse. Cohen (2013) provides a picture of sexual violence as a tool for building cohesion when a non-state armed group forcibly recruits fighters. Ex-Palipehutu-FNL members point to their dependence on civilians as a reason for putting in place the edict against sexual violence in the first place. Muvumba Sellström (2015a) posits that this is what motivates rebel group conduct.

Other important distinctions require further study. Tentative evidence shows that state actors (government security agents, police, military) are more likely to commit sexual violence during and immediately after conflict (Muvumba Sellström 2015a, 2015b; Nordås 2011, 2012). These findings are drawn from reports from international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), news reports, and US State Department Human Rights reports. It is possible



Figure 10.10 | Nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2016.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (FAS). https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/warheadhistory.jpg

that these sources focus on the state. At least, state abuses may be more observable to the press and to NGOs.

To conclude, the deeper appreciation for variation offers an opportunity. If some armed actors control their fighters, despite gender inequality, then conflict-related sexual violence is preventable. Finding out why and how, will be an important contribution to our collective social progress.

10.2.5 Nuclear Weapons and Military Expenditures

10.2.5.1 Developments in Global Nuclear Weapons Arsenals

The previous sections have dealt with ongoing uses of violence for political purposes. One of the bases for military action is the military capability that the parties command. Thus, it is important to observe the trends both in nuclear weapons and in the conventional arsenals. Figures 10.10 and 10.11 have pertinent information with respect to nuclear weapons issues.

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While nuclear weapons reduction has slowly continued – due primarily to the United States and Russia, which collectively have over 93 percent of the world's nuclear weapons – the leading nuclear weapons-possessing countries continue to invest in expensive, comprehensive nuclear modernization programs. This takes place despite these two countries recently renewing their commitment to nuclear arms reduction with the successor to START, the 2011 bilateral Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The states with smaller such arsenals have begun following suit, and many are expanding their nuclear arsenals, namely, China, India, and Pakistan (SIPRI 2016a).

As the head of the SIPRI Nuclear Weapons Project, Shannon Kile, recently pronounced, "Despite the ongoing reduction in the number of weapons, the prospects for genuine progress towards nuclear disarmament remain gloomy" (SIPRI 2016b).

Figure 10.11 demonstrates the differences in nuclear capacity. North Korea's capacity is not included but it is likely to be smaller than what is often project to be the Israeli inventory (which is not acknowledged by the Israeli government). However, it may be more strategically significant for the North Korean regime.[33] Increasingly unified international pressure on North Korea has not been able to stop the country's move towards a more advanced capacity in weapons as well as in delivery system. There are no negotiations going on to deal with this problem. Instead, the developments add to the gloom expressed by SIPRI research Kile.

At the same time, the agreement with Iran on its nuclear program is likely to effectively halt the possibility of this country becoming the tenth nuclear weapons state. The likelihood of any other country initiating a nuclear weapons program today seems remote. In that sense, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has slowed down the spread of such weapons around the world. This points to the ability of negotiations to actually achieve results in this field, and thus suggests the urgency of increasing the international efforts in this regard.

10.2.5.2 Developments in Military Expenditures

Military expenditures are a further indication of the ability and willingness of states to undertake military and violent action for their own defense and, possibly, global security. Figure 10.12 shows the trends in global military spending. Table 10.3 then provides the total expenditure for key countries as well as trends in spending for these countries during the past 10 years. Both these graphs are drawn from SIPRI, which is seen to be a reliable source for such estimates.

After declining precipitously with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world military expenditures began sharply rising in the first decade of the twenty-first century. With the global economic crisis, military spending in much of the world halted or declined. World military expenditures rose in 2015 for the first time since 2011, partially reflecting the recovery of North American and European countries from

[33] See Baker (2016).



Note: North Korea has produced fissile material for 10–12 warheads and detonated 4 nuclear test assemblies, but we're not aware of public information that shows it has yet stockpiled weaponized warheads.

Figure 10.11 | Estimated nuclear weapons inventories, 2016.
Source: Kristensen and Norris 2016

the economic crisis. Likewise, this recent rise has been propelled by the continued military spending growth in China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, which have offset the expenditure declines experienced in other parts of the globe.

According to Table 10.3 world military expenditure in 2015 totaled 1,676 billion dollars, the 15 top spenders were responsible for more than 80 percent of this. It is notable that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, UK, France, Russia, and China) alone spent close to 60 percent of the world expenditures. Thus, the accumulated military power, if these states acted in concert, would be overwhelming. For many countries, these statistics also suggest that military expenditures is done at a considerable price for the national economy, constituting more than 5 percent of GDP, for instance, for Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Israel, and also Russia. For the first three it may be a response to the turmoil facing the region, as can be seen in the fact that Saudi Arabia's military expenditures have risen by almost 100 percent in the past 10 years. Only the United Arab Emirates and China have growth rates exceeding this, in the first case certainly also an effect of the regional turmoil, while for the latter it has increased concerns in East Asia about China's long-term ambition.

Thus, the military data reinforces the picture that emerges from the analysis of armed conflicts and terrorism. There are some regions that find themselves in particularly challenging circumstance. When facing immediate security challenges from conditions in the neighborhood, there are strong incentives to invest in defense, and, as a corollary, be attempted to intervene in one form or another.

The type of weapons and the military expenditures reported in Figure 10.12 and Table 10.3 largely related to major arms. It also highlights the importance of major manufacturers of arms and their interest in export of weapons as a factor.[34] Many of the wars in, say, Africa, do not use such heavy equipment. It is notable that there are no African countries among the 15 top spenders. The estimate made by SIPRI military expenditures for all of Africa is set at US€ 37 billion, which is about 2 percent of the world total.[35] It would put the entire continent (of more than 50 countries) at number 10 in Table 10.3. Still it is a continent that has large share of all armed conflicts, regularly around a third (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). This means that these wars are fought with smaller weapons, which thus are capable of creating considerable havoc in poor countries and dilute their resources even more. A recent report of the Small Arms Survey points out that just two countries (China and Russia) hold almost 25 percent of the total global inventory of such weapons. It also states that newly manufactured weapons outstrip the destruction of surplus firearms.[36] This means that the world's holding of such weapons increases. It is likely that they are not only used for politically motivated wars, but also find their ways to organized crime and to individuals, making possible school shootings and other events with less overt political motivations. In other words, there is a considerable undocumented trade in small arms.

[34] There is a major discussion as to the role of the military industry in security affairs. Clearly, industry is highly important in issues of procurement, planning and development of weapons. It is more difficult to document its role in decisions to go to a particular war, military intervention, or other forms uses of weapons. The debate of the 1980s on military-industrial complexes needs to be revisited.

[35] Table 10.5, SIPRI.

[36] www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlight-rn34.html

Table 10.3 | Military spending: 15 top spenders, 2006–2015

Rank						Spending as a share of GDP (%)[b]	
2015	2014[a]	Country	Spending 2015 ($ b.)	Change, 2006–2015 (%)	World share 2015 (%)	2015	2006
1	1	USA	596	3.9	36	3.3	3.8
2	2	China	[215]	132	[13]	[1.91]	[2.01]
3	4	Saudi Arabia	87.2	9	5.2	13.7	7.8
4	3	Russia	66.4	91	4.0	5.4	3.5
5	6	UK	55.5	–7.2	3.3	2.0	2.2
6	7	India	51.3	43	3.1	2.3	2.5
7	5	France	50.9	–5.9	3.0	2.1	2.3
8	9	Japan	40.9	0.5	2.4	1.0	1.0
9	8	Germany	39.4	2.8	2.4	1.2	1.3
10	10	South Korea	36.4	37	2.2	2.6	2.5
11	11	Brazil	24.6	38	1.5	1.4	1.5
12	12	Italy	23.8	30	1.4	1.3	1.7
13	13	Australia	23.6	32	1.4	1.9	1.8
14	14	UAE[c]	[22.8]	136	[1.4]	[5.]	[3.2]
15	15	Israel	16.1	2.6	1.0	5.4	7.5
Total top 15			1,350		81		
World total			1,676	19	100	2.3	2.3

[a] Rankings for 2014 are based on updated military expenditure figures for 2014 in the current edition of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. They may therefore differ from the rankings for 2014 given in the SIPRI Yearbook 2015 and in other SIPRI publications in 2015.

[b] The figures for military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) are based on estimates of 2015 GDP from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015.

[c] The figures for UAE are for 2014, as no data is available for 2015. The percentage change is from 2006 to 2014.

Source: SIPRI (2015).



Figure 10.12 | Military expenditures, 1988–2015.
Note: No data for USSR 1991, thus no total.
Source: SIPRI. www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2016/world-military-spending-resumes-upward-course-says-sipri.

10.2.6 Conclusion

In this section, we have scrutinized some of the trends and insights into the most devastating forms of violence: armed conflicts, war, terrorist acts, homicide, and suicide. The trends that can be observed do not necessarily all point in the same direction. The long-term trends have been one of declining violence of all forms. However, lately armed conflicts, wars, and terrorism have again been on the rise. As studies of homicide show, there is a close connection between armed conflict and homicide. One may thus fear an upsurge also in such violence, even if some of the presently ongoing wars are terminated. This means that the world faces intense challenges to deal with the threats of violence. Thus, we turn to the possibilities of dealing with such challenges.

10.3 Peace and Security

10.3.1 International Peace and Security

The challenges we have indicated in the previous sections directly relate to the security of the inhabitants of this planet. The challenges may be more acute to some regions than to others and some individuals than others, but it is all part of the same global threat. The insecurity of some can quickly be the insecurity of all, particularly in this globalized age. The task for the world is thus both conceptual and practical. How shall the present situations be analyzed and how can it be approached? The methodologies and conclusions are likely to vary, but the importance of concerted action may be less disputed. As the assignment is global in nature, it should be the domain of international institutions in general and the UN in particular. The purpose of the UN according to Article 1 is exactly to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." Thus, in this section we will study some of the means available for such responses.

Figure 10.13 presents the activity of the UN Security Council as the main organ for deciding on the collective measures for the worlds as a whole. The increased work of the Council can be seen in the number of decisions in general (resolutions) and in particular the resolutions taken under Chapter VII (which are binding for the entire membership). This includes decisions on sending out mediators and peacekeepers, or imposing sanctions, supporting disarmament measures, or initiating peacebuilding work. The third line in the Figure shows the number of draft resolutions that have been vetoed by one or more permanent members of the Council. The Figure demonstrated an impressive activation of the Council since the end of the Cold War.

When comparing this curve to the one of Figure 10.1 it can be observed that the increased activity of the Council in the 1990s actually corresponds to a reduction in armed conflict. However, the increase of armed conflict observed since 2011 does not see an accompanying increasing of Council activity, at least not in terms of making more decisions. A study of the actual texts of the resolutions would, however, most likely demonstrate the increased complexity and the difficulty in handling some of the conflicts. Some of the most urgent wars, however, have not seen concerted action by this UN body, notably those over Syria and Ukraine. It may point to an important deficiency in the international set up. However, before looking for remedies, let us pursue some of the means commonly used by the international, regional, and national bodies involved in dealing with global issues of violence and war.

10.3.2 Disarmament Issues

The availability of weapons, munitions, and spare parts as well as training of soldiers, refining equipment, and finding bases for action are important for the initiation and continuation of wars, armed conflicts and terrorist deeds. The trends were observed in Section 10.2.3. A radical way of dealing with this is to find effective forms of disarmament. Table 10.4 lists all major international disarmament treaties that have been agreed among states since 1963, i.e. 27 treaties in 53 years. It is not an impressive rate, as it suggests only one treaty every second year. Given the size of nuclear arsenals, the extent of military expenditures, the increase in armed conflicts, and the challenge of terrorism, this is not an inspiring record. On the contrary, it demonstrates an inability of the international community to face the challenge of political organized violence in a joint manner. As several of the treaties have been quite effective, it is possible for states to agree in ways that are sufficiently detailed to stand the tests of implementation. We have mentioned the Non-Proliferation Treaty earlier. In the case of the ban on chemical weapons the world was able to act jointly against Syria's use of such weapons in 2013 and have them abolished within a year. Thus, the world can conclude agreements of high quality and make sure they are implemented, if this is given shared priority. The latest agreement, the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013 is now in place and has begun its work to control illicit transfers of arms. It remains to be seen and there are many suggestions for its improvement, for instance, as expressed by the Small Arms Survey: the need for a standardized international reporting system.[37] It is, however, the only treaty that would actually have an impact on all the three types of violence we have scrutinized here: wars, terrorism and homicide.[38]

As can be seen in Table 10.4 most of the treaties have concerned weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons), delivery systems (missiles in particular) and some very specific conventional weapons (land mines, in particular). Some of the measures are regional, rather than global, and some treaties have replaced or deepened earlier agreements. As could be seen in Figure 10.10, the agreements on nuclear weapons have resulted in substantial reductions in the inventories, but by no means led to the type of removal of entire systems as was discussed in the 1980s, and resulted in the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in 1988. As indicated by the increase in global military expenditures, the world seems close to facing a new upsurge in weapons development, not the least as some of the leading nuclear weapon states are engaged in new weapons projects. Thus, the achievements of international disarmament remain disconcerting and the international actions to deal with them are not convincing.

10.3.3 Peacemaking and Mediation

10.3.3.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War and particularly since the demise of the Cold War, the settlement of conflicts through mediation has become increasingly common. In the 1990s there were more mediation attempts than during the preceding four decades combined (Grieg and Diehl 2012), and the proportion of conflicts ending in peace agreements exceeded those ending in military victory (Kreutz 2010). Other prominent trends over the past two decades include a shift in

[37] www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/highlight-rn34.html
[38] UNODC (2013: 69) gives considerable attention to this treaty.



Figure 10.13 | UN Security Council Resolutions 1946–2014.
Source: Wallensteen and Johansson 2015.

mediation from inter- to intrastate conflict (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2012); a growing involvement of regional organizations in peacemaking (Gartner 2011) and the institutionalization and professionalization of international mediation (Convergne 2016).[33]

This section identifies factors relating to the success or failure of mediation and highlights the importance of mediation but also warns against exaggerating the role and influence of the mediator; it covers the institutionalization of the field as well as the major deficiencies and challenges; it identifies ways of reducing the risk that peace agreements break down; and it suggests that more attention should be paid to post-conflict constitutions as the definitive peace agreements. The discussion focuses on the resolution of intrastate conflict, which are more common than interstate conflict.

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10.3.3.1.1 The Relative Importance of Mediation

The importance of international mediation in deadly conflict is unquestionable. It is frequently the only bridge from hostilities to peace and it can forge among mortal enemies a consensual platform for long-term reconciliation, reconstruction and state building. Where it fails, as in Darfur from 2004 to the present, Syria from 2012 to date and Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide, the fatalities and destruction can reach catastrophic proportions. By contrast, in 1996 UN mediation ended the civil war in Guatemala, in 2005 the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development mediated an end to the decades-long war in Sudan and in 2008 the African Union mediation in the Kenyan electoral conflict prevented a descent into protracted violence.

Increasingly, mediation research is concerned with the durability of peace agreements. A key question in this regard is whether mediated settlements are more or less likely than military victories to lead to a recurrence of violence. According to Kreutz, 9.5 percent of military victories in the 1990s restarted and this rose to 40 percent of victories in the early 2000s; by contrast, 46.1 percent of negotiated settlements led to resumed hostilities in the 1990s and this fell to 21 percent in the early 2000s (cited in Wallensteen and Svensson 2014: 323). Others paint a more pessimistic picture: coinciding with the shift in war termination from military victory to negotiated settlement, the relapse rate has progressively increased since the 1960s, with 60 percent of conflicts in the early 2000s relapsing within five years (von Einsiedel 2017).

The scholarly literature on international mediation is primarily concerned with the question of what accounts for success and failure. The dependent variable is mediation outcomes and the main independent variables can be divided into two categories, i.e. those concerning structural condition and those having to do with the process (Kleiboer 1996).[34] Among the first are matters relating to the conflict (its duration, its intensity, the issues, and whether it is ripe for resolution through negotiations (Zartman 2001)). Then, there are variables relating to the disputant parties (their cohesiveness, political orientation, motivation to mediate, and previous and ongoing

[33] For a review of the scholarly literature on international mediation, see Wallensteen and Svensson (2014).
[34] For recent reviews of the literature, see Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) and Wall and Dunne (2012).

Table 10.4 | International arms control treaties

International disarmament treaties and agreements	
Arms Trade Treaty	June 25, 2013
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	May 10, 2010
Mine Ban Treaty	March 21, 2010
Convention on Cluster Munitions	May 30, 2008
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)	November 25, 2002
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)	May 24, 2002
Open Skies Treaty	January 1, 2002
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)	September 26, 1997
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	April 1, 1997
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	September 17, 1996
African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty	April 11, 1996
Treaty of Pelindaba	October 26, 1994
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	January 7, 1993
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I)	October 1, 1992
Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	January 1, 1989
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty	December 27, 1988
South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)	August 6, 1985
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II)	June 18, 1979
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)	April 4, 1976
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	March 26, 1975
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)	July 1, 1974
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)	May 26, 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty	May 26, 1972
Seabed Arms Control Treaty	May 18, 1972
Outer Space Treaty	October 10, 1970
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)	March 5, 1970
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)	October 10, 1963

Source: Arms Control Association. www.armscontrol.org/treaties?page=2

relationships). Furthermore there are factors relating to the mediator variables, (impartiality, status, identity, and power) and finally international context (superpower involvement in the conflict, regional dynamics, and related conflicts).

The process variables have to do with the mediator's style and strategies. A useful typology is that of Touval and Zartman, distinguishing between the mediator as a "communicator," "formulator," and "manipulator" (Touval and Zartman 1985). The mediator as communicator is a "passive conduit and repository," serving as a channel of communication and conveyer of messages and proposals between the parties. The mediator as formulator plays a more active role, assisting the parties to redefine issues or devise solutions to their conflict. At the most assertive end of the spectrum, the mediator as manipulator uses leverage to push and pull the parties towards an agreement. While examples of each of these roles can readily be found, it is often the case that the mediator and mediating organization play all three roles in a conflict, sometimes sequentially and sometimes concurrently, and almost always in parallel with interventions by other external actors. There is no consensus in the literature on which style and strategy of mediation is most effective (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014: 319).

Notwithstanding the importance of mediation, however, the mediator's role and influence should not be overstated. By definition, mediation requires the consent of the conflict parties, who must be willing to transcend their mutual hatred and suspicion and embark on a cooperative process of negotiation and problem-solving. Without this willingness, there may be little that a mediator can do. The mediator's assets are soft and intangible, encompassing stature, credibility, and a distinct set of personal attributes and skills. Even if the mediator is backed by powerful actors that offer attractive inducements and put concerted pressure on the parties, mediation will not make progress unless the adversaries believe that their interests are likely to be served through a negotiated settlement. In short, the burden of peacemaking lies more with the parties (and their allies and patrons) than with the mediator.

Nevertheless, the fallacy of the mediator as a demi-god is widespread. It is evident in policy perspectives that they expect mediators to craft agreements in perfect compliance with liberal norms, regardless of the wishes of the conflict parties; in academic work that places too much weight on the mediator's characteristics and strategies as determinants of the outcome of negotiations; in the hubris of mediating organizations that imagine they can rapidly bring the parties to their senses through a combination of persuasion, carrots, and sticks; and in the pressure that donors put on mediators to broker a peace agreement quickly. Put differently, the fallacy here is to treat negotiations as sub-species of mediation when in fact it is the other way round.

10.3.3.2 Mediation Professionalism and Deficiencies

The UN has played a pioneering role in the professionalization and institutionalization of international mediation. It has established a mediation support unit in the Department of Political Affairs; a standby team of mediation advisers, available for rapid deployment to support peace processes throughout the world; an academic advisory council on mediation; and several specialist training programs (Convergne 2016). Similarly, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union, and other regional bodies have set up mediation structures and made efforts to enhance the quality of their peacemaking endeavors.

The impact of this professionalization and institutionalization is unclear. There is certainly much greater knowledge, expertise, and capacity than in previous decades but the field remains wracked by serious deficiencies. Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed refer to these deficiencies as the "seven deadly sins of mediation" (Brahimi and Ahmed 2008). The "original sin of mediation" is a mediator's ignorance regarding the conflict dynamics, parties, and history. This is compounded by the sin of arrogance, where mediators are untroubled by their ignorance, assuming that the conflict before them is pretty much like the previous ones. The other deadly sins, according to Brahimi and Ahmed, are partiality, impotence, haste, inflexibility, and false promises.

Quite often, moreover, mediators intervene in complex conflicts without a comprehensive plan, believing that the need for flexibility in

volatile situations is antithetical to sound planning. But in the absence of a strategic plan, mediations lack cohesion and direction, they tend to be reactive rather than proactive and they do not inspire confidence among the conflict parties. Another general malaise lies in the sphere of evaluation, learning, and adaptation. There is an endless stream of "lessons learnt" workshops, and manuals on mediation but the findings do not lead to the requisite reform of practice and systems. Consequently, there is insufficient institutionalized learning over time and the same mistakes are repeated from one mediation to the next.

10.3.3.3 Mediation Challenges

Over the past 20 years regional organizations in some parts of the world have become more assertive in addressing conflicts in their neighborhood (Gartner 2011; Wallensteen and Bjurner 2015). This has often been accompanied by synergistic cooperation between these organizations, the UN and other external players.[41] The downside is that the multiplicity of mediation actors has also led to coordination problems, nasty competition over the leadership of a mediation, and "forum shopping" by the conflict parties.[42] In Africa there have been many divisive clashes between mediating bodies, including the cases of Burkina Faso (2015), the Central African Republic (2003, 2013, and 2015), Côte d'Ivoire (2011), Darfur (2011), Guinea (2009), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Libya (2011), Madagascar (2009), Mali (2012), Sudan (2008), and Zimbabwe (2008) (Nathan 2017; Wallensteen and Bjurner 2015). Although the UN Secretary-General has called for 'coherence, coordination and complementarity' among external actors involved in peace efforts (UN 2012: 18–19), the UN has not established reliable mechanisms to achieve this (Nathan 2017).

Other mediation challenges that have attracted attention over the past few years are the need for greater involvement of women in negotiation and mediation teams; broadening peace processes beyond the negotiating table and engaging women's groups and other civil society formations; the incorporation of gender provisions in peace agreements; the role of mediators during the implementation of agreements; the pressure on mediators to promote the UN's ever expanding normative agenda; the UN ban on amnesties for war crimes, which sometimes puts mediators at loggerheads with the conflict parties; the difficulty of mediating with parties that are fragmented; the many conundrums related to negotiations with extremists; and the development of national capacities for mediation and dialogue.

10.3.3.4 Implementation of Peace Agreements

Peace agreements are not self-implementing. Many of them break down, resulting in renewed hostilities.[43] One possible reason is that the parties, under pressure from external actors, sign an agreement without any intention of honoring it. Alternatively, they might initially be committed to implementing the agreement but then change their minds because of opposition from within a party or a change in the balance of power between the parties. A third possibility is that implementation disputes escalate because of the abiding enmity and suspicion among the parties. Fourth, there may be inadequate external support for implementation, especially in relation to security arrangements. Fifth, parties that did not participate in the negotiations might seek to wreck the settlement through violence.

A review of practice and the literature has identified a number of mediation approaches and strategies that might reduce the risk of breakdown (Stedman 2001). Some of these naturally relate to the content of the agreement. A sustainable agreement is likely to be one that, to the greatest extent possible, meets the primary needs, concerns, and aspirations of all parties and communities; avoids marginalizing any party or community; addresses the root causes of the conflict; and lays the basis for representative and inclusive governance. The agreement should also include an implementation plan that covers responsibilities, a time schedule and monitoring, and verification and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Mediators and donors are mistaken, though, if they believe that the "magic" lies in the text of the peace agreement. Rather, the key to success lies in changing the relationship between the parties. Violent intrastate conflict emerges not only from substantive disputes and grievances but also from a chronic deterioration in political and social relationships. The violence itself does massive damage to relationships. The mediator must therefore prioritize the challenge of political reconciliation, assisting the parties to shift their disposition from implacable enmity to non-violent political competition and cooperation. In deadly conflicts this cannot be done quickly and it is imprudent for donors and other international actors to urge mediators to move with undue haste.

A related imperative is that the agreement must be owned by the protagonists and not forced on them by mediators. In intrastate conflicts it is also desirable that the negotiations and resultant peace agreement are anchored in civil society and enjoy public support. This helps to minimize popular fears and suspicion about the talks, contributes to the legitimacy of the process and the agreements, cultivates national ownership and not merely elite ownership, and for all these reasons contributes to the sustainability of the agreement (UN 2012).

The period immediately after the signing of a peace agreement is one of great danger and uncertainty, which is heightened if there is a delay between the disbandment of the mediation team and the formation of the implementation support team and mechanisms. The implementation team should be set up, and implementation planning should begin, prior to the conclusion of negotiations. Conversely, it is unwise for a mediation team to disband as soon as the agreement is signed.

[41] See, for instance, United Nations (2015a).

[42] See, for instance, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (1999).

[43] The estimates vary and may depend on definitions. See von Einsiedel (2017), Wallensteen and Svensson (2012) and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2007), p. 13. On implementation difficulties see Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002). The Peace Accords Matrix at the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, maps the degree of implementation in comprehensive peace agreements, see https://peaceaccords.nd.edu.

The team ought to be retained, with some continuity in its membership, to support dispute resolution during the implementation phase.

10.3.3.5 The Post-Conflict Constitution as the Peace Agreement

The outcomes of peace agreements are not limited to the absence or recurrence of hostilities. Rather, they vary along a spectrum that covers renewed fighting, low-level instability, stability without social justice, and a durable peace characterized by justice, equitable development, and good governance. These outcomes are not determined solely by the content of the peace agreement. They emerge from a wide range of domestic and external factors and institutions that traverse the political, economic, and social realms.

A critical institution that has been neglected in studies on the durability and impact of peace agreements is the post-conflict constitution.[44] Many such constitutions incorporate key provisions of the peace agreement and some of them emerge directly from the peace agreement's stipulations on constitutional reform.[45] Examples include the constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Bougainville (2004), Cambodia (1993), Kenya (2010), Mozambique (1992), South Africa (1993), and Sudan (2005). These constitutions may amount to legal versions of the peace agreements. In the long term they constitute the definitive peace agreements because, unlike the accords signed by the conflict parties, they enjoy the status of supreme law, they have enduring authority, they are justiciable and enforceable, they are binding on the state and all groups and citizens, and they can be amended if they become outdated. In addition, the content and the process of drafting a post-conflict constitution has sometimes played a conciliatory and unifying role, seeking to overcome historical divisions and forge a national vision and identity (Widner 2005). And in a broader sense, peace is maintained through a constitution's classic functions of regulating political competition, constraining the exercise of power, protecting individuals and groups, and establishing procedures and mechanisms for non-violent management and resolution of conflict.

In reality, of course, a post-conflict constitution might not live up to these ideals and it may well enshrine elite pacts and compromises on land, justice, and other matters, derived from the negotiated settlement, that lay the seeds for subsequent tension and instability. The constitution can be a much revered or much abused instrument, a site of political contestation, or a vehicle that serves to contain and resolve political disputes. In any event, the crucial point is that the salience of a peace agreement fades with the passing of time, whereas the constitution's strengths and limitations as a peacemaking institution may have abiding significance.

10.3.4 Prevention of War and One-Sided Violence

The responses to the threats of new wars and to one-sided violence, such as terrorism, mass murder and genocide largely seem to fall into two categories, which could be labeled *direct and structural approaches*. The first set of approaches are oriented towards detecting and preventing more or less imminent action, e.g. through measures of early warning, surveillance, and rapid reaction forces, as well as identifying potential perpetrators, their environment, resources, and movements (including international travel).

The latter approach points to broader changes in society that minimize the likelihood of violent action at large, e.g. through inclusion, respect for diversity and policy participation. This includes education, training, and providing jobs consonant with qualifications, where the purpose is to reduce social frustration in society.

It is not possible at this juncture the make an assessment of any of these strategies. An example can be given from studies of genocide prevention and one from the study of terrorism.

10.3.4.1 Preventing Genocide: Possible Approaches

Direct prevention requires detailed information on early warning signals and a capacity to act early. There are ideas about how to do this, notably in the form of a genocide watch. One approach has been the attempt to identify the steps that lead to genocide and, at the same time, demonstrating the urgency of action and what do to when the threats are at different stages. This approach is associated particularly with the work of Gregory Stanton. Initially he suggested 7 steps, later they were 8 steps, most recently 10 (Stanton 2016). The points are logical and make intuitive sense, and include matters such as classification, dehumanization, organization, polarization, identification, and extermination, later adding others, for instance, discrimination, persecution, and denial. However, these stages are difficult to research as they are hard to separate from each other. Genocides do not necessarily follow a logically ordered sequence. Thus, researchers have converted some of the stages into factors that can play a role, not the least adding historical experiences, as no society "starts" toward genocide from a "normal" condition.

In particular, it is difficult to separate genocide from other ongoing developments in a society. There is a very close connection to war or other violent upheavals. War can provide an opportunity for genocide, but genocide, as Lemkin noted, may also lead to war as it enhances government control over a society. Obviously, conditions of war may make government and populations more susceptible to ideas of genocide against imagined enemies. This is also one of the first observations Harff makes in her statistical study on genocides since 1955. She notes that almost all genocides "occurred in the immediate aftermath of internal wars, revolutions, and regime collapse" (Harff 2003: 57). Thus, preventing war may at the same time prevent genocide. There are, however, events included in Harff's list that are separate from civil or international wars. An example is Indonesia in 1965, where the authorities targeted Communists (who often were Chinese in origin). It followed on an attempted coup. Although the coup did not

[44] For an exception that considers the constitution-making process in the context of peacebuilding, see Samuels (2005).

[45] Peace agreement stipulations regarding constitutional reform are recorded in the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame (https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/).

lead to regime collapse, it still resulted in a change of power followed by a deliberate use of the state apparatus to target a large and well-organized group. About half a million persons were killed. As this, furthermore, took place during the Cold War, the anti-communism of the West and the strategic significance of Indonesia muted Western reactions. Notably, the case is not closed as, in June 2016, an international tribunal found the Indonesian government responsible for the events of 1965, describing them as a crime against humanity, while also criticizing Western governments.[46]

Direct prevention raises the question of whether it is enough to prevent the onset of civil war to also prevent genocides. One strain of thought suggests that focus should be on state failure and "weak states." If states are more stable and better integrated, the likelihood of genocides may be reduced. Of course, the Holocaust resulted from a highly organized and effective state, suggesting that too strong a state may not be desirable either. Harff's list includes a number of states that were well organized, resource rich and capable of acting, at the time of the atrocities, e.g. China in Tibet in 1959 and during the Cultural Revolution after 1966, Chile following the coup in 1973, Syria in 1982, and the Serbian state in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Thus, it is not the weakness as such that is important. Instead, Harff concludes that it is the "political upheaval" that determines the events that follow. This description fits all but one of the cases listed (Harff 2003: 62). However, there are many upheavals that do not result in genocides. That leads to an additional conclusion: Exclusionary ideologies constitute an important part of the picture. There is often an ideological component to the persecution that takes place, and governments may in fact maintain power through the help of such ideological components. Thus, it is not likely that they will be willing to participate in preventive measures. The international community has to act. The UN Special Advisers on prevention of genocide and responsibility has now been merged into one office. It could be a sign of increasing international commitment to this issue.

What would a structural approach entail? As there is a close connection between war and genocide, the explanations for civil wars yield some suggestions. The concept of quality peace can help this discussion (Wallensteen 2015). It leads to three observations.

First, the issue of discrimination is often central. In the work of Harff it plays a role, as part of the "exclusionary" ideologies. There is a lot to say that diversity in a society may make the society complex to govern, but it does not in itself generate civil war or genocide. On the contrary, diversity is likely to be a stimulant to economic growth, culture, and political life.

However, when coupled with discrimination, matters become difficult and serious (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). If one group has more resources than another, and actively works to maintain its power, then violence, armed conflict, and genocide may follow. It can take many forms. A small elite that is in power and is identified along any of these markers (national, ethnical, racial, and religious) may fear the majority and turn into a repressive regime (e.g. Assad and the Alawites in Syria 2016). Or a sizeable group may be marginalized, although it previously has been dominant or well resourced, thus becoming a basis for recruitment for rebels (e.g. Tamils in Sri Lanka, where some turned to LTTE, Sunnis in Iraq where some turned to IS). Thus, a society with quality peace is one that can respect the dignity of all human beings, whatever their identity may be. A very valid indicator is gender equality (Melander 2005).

Second, insecurity created by governments and/or rebels will make most inhabitants concerned, thus supporting measures that are expected to lead to their protection. Allegiance will go to the one that is the most effective. The easy availability of weapons, in other words, plays a role in the onset of civil wars. In terms of genocides, we may also see threats, notably semi-controlled militia groups or self-proclaimed defense forces that inject fear in other groups. Thus, providing safety for daily life is important for a society to maintain a peace with quality. In the immediate post-genocide conditions, international protection may be one of the most effective ways of setting a society on the path toward a peace with quality.

Third, the expectations for the future are most important. If the expectation is that peace will last, and that there will be no (re) occurrence of civil war or genocide, the inhabitants will invest (e.g. in education or production) and thus contribute to sustaining the peace. However, if there is fear that the conditions are likely to (again) result in war and/or genocide, defensive measures may add to a spiral of increasing antagonism and violence. Genocide studies demonstrate that there is a history of exclusion, previous persecution, and genocide. Thus, to break such historical cycles is a necessary ingredient in the construction of quality peace after a civil war as well as after genocide.

10.3.4.2 Preventing Terrorism: Possible Approaches

While the exact combination of strategies to counter-terrorism depends heavily on the specifics of the system in question and the respective sociopolitical and cultural contexts, some principles can be formulated:

A critical problem in strategies such as the global "war on terrorism" and national counter-terrorism is a lack of understanding counter-terrorism as a security activity distinct from military or policing operations. Thus, the primary goals of countering terrorism are not coercion, enforcement or retaliation, but prevention and preemptive disruption of terrorist activity.

The focus on countering terrorism financing, logistics, and access to weapons and other materials is important. At the same time considerable attention needs to be paid to pro-actively reducing terrorists' ability to exploit new information and communication technologies both for ideological propaganda and mobilization purposes, and, increasingly, as an organizing tool for network-building and operational purposes.

In short, it would mean that antiterrorism strategy is more effective if it systematically tries to undermine two key comparative advantages of militant-terrorist actors – their extremist ideologies and organizational

[46] www.cnn.com/2016/07/21/asia/indonesia-genocide-panel/.

systems. Only a balance between functionality and legality, legitimacy and respect for human rights can ensure that antiterrorism does not produce more terrorism than it seeks to reduce.

To this can be added – as stated in the introduction of this chapter – if violence, particularly in its most extreme form such as terrorism, is more frequently the opposite to social movements, non-armed conflicts, i.e. to constructive change, then, the reduction of terrorism should be sought through re-inventing or re-launching of debates between actors able to talk and negotiate together. This could be true at all levels, including the transnational one, and this should combine different levels of action – something that is never easy to achieve.

Thus, preventing terrorism is a highly complex issue. It means dealing with various levels of action, various territories, and various temporalities, and articulating all this more or less at the same time.

The levels of actions extend from the very individual, for instance when the personality of some persons could lead to violence, to the more global or collective, for instance when international agreements are at stake. The issue of territories goes from the very local, for instance when one understands that a small town has been the place for the creation of a terrorist group or even a network, as was the case in France with Lunel (in the Gard department) or in Spain with Ripoll (Catalonia), to whole regions, today mainly the Middle East, but also parts of sub-Saharan Africa in order to understand Boko Haram. Preventing terrorism means in this regard not only taking into account these different types of territories, but also their articulation, for instance between what is at stake at the national level within a country such as France, or Spain, or Tunisia, and what is at stake in the whole Middle East, including Iraq or Syria, but also Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Iran.

In addition, one has to take into account the temporal perspective going from the very short term to the "longue durée." Prevention in the very short term means first of all the use of intelligence, police, diplomacy, and it comes with an important concern: short-term policies may include measures that could threaten democracy, as clearly stated by those that criticize the Patriot Act in the United States. Prevention in the "longue durée" means public policies, in education, employment, etc., but also some diplomacy. Too often, when a country faces terrorism, prevention refers only to short-term measures, and when there appears to be no more attacks, governments and public opinion show very little interest in dealing with the issue in the "longue durée," which, after all, is the only effective preventive action for sustaining a society.

10.3.5 Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is central to social progress as it seeks to address justice and the structural root-causes to conflict (Aggestam and Björkdahl 2013; Mani 2002; Philpott 2012). Peacebuilding is therefore closely connected to positive peace (Galtung 1969), social, economic, and political progress by its ambition to build peace beyond the cessation of direct and organized violence (negative peace). This brief section on peacebuilding provides an overview of recent trends in the field of practice as well as in theory. It concludes with a reflective note on the current debates and how the contemporary peacebuilding is standing at the crossroads. This discussion recurs in the concluding chapter with a note on resilient peacebuilding.

The peacebuilding field is relatively new and evolved as a response to the growing number of intrastate conflicts in the early 1990s. It was triggered after the end of the Cold War by the initial optimism about new prospects for collective actions within the United Nations (UN). At the same time, it was a response to the increasing number of intrastate conflicts with their devastating consequences of ethnic cleansing and genocide that had taken place in areas such as the Western Balkans and Rwanda. A noticeable mobilization on the international arena to act was observed, which included humanitarian military interventions and long-term international engagement to build peace (Hoffman and Weiss 2006; Philpott and Powers 2010). Taking the lead, former UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched a new peacebuilding agenda in the document *Agenda for Peace* (1995) where peacebuilding is "defined as action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." The document contained an ambitious agenda that underlined the responsibility of the international community not only to manage but also to prevent conflict. Hence, peacebuilding was launched in an attempt to resolve problems associated with fragile, failing, and dysfunctional states in order to transform them into robust liberal democracies. The prospect of building peace and security was also to be bolstered and embedded by economic development, interdependence, and regional cooperation. Consequently, comprehensive peace support operations began to expand dramatically from the early 1990s onwards not only in numbers but also in their multifunctional tasks and mandates (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006). In sum, the practice of peacebuilding largely evolved into state building (Call and Wyeth 2008; Chandler 2010).

10.3.5.1 Institutionalization of Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is often described as the institutionalization of peace, which aims to balance the twin objectives of consolidating peace and averting a relapse into conflict (Mani 2002). There are numerous definitions and concepts associated with peacebuilding, which reflects the broad range of activities associated with the term (Call and Wyeth 2008; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Jeong 2005). Furthermore, the concept of peacebuilding serves as an umbrella notion, which overlaps with many other spheres of peacemaking, peacekeeping, development, reconciliation, institution building, and democracy promotion.

Ramsbotham and others (2012) suggests a useful analytical overview of peacebuilding, which is summarized in four dimensions. The first regards the *military/security*, focusing on establishing order and security in the post-conflict phase. For instance, peacekeeping troops can rapidly be deployed as a way to bolster a ceasefire, peace agreement, and to restore the monopoly of violence after the violence has ceased. Thus, the quest to integrate various military branches in to one and to transform rebel groups to political parties is of critical importance for the security and order (Edmunds 2008; Ekengren and Simons 2013; Lyons 2005; Sriram and Herman 2009). This ambition is reflected in the number of programs that the international community

has launched in recent years on Demilitarization, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and with Security Sector Reforms (SSR). The second dimension of peacebuilding is *political/constitutional*, which focuses on supporting the political and democratic transition from war to peace by assisting in restoring law and order, for instance by drafting and making constitutional reforms and amendments, holding elections, and strengthening civil society. In addition, one central aim is to introduce and build good governance and to establish a strong justice sector, which can monitor the adherence of human rights and democratic norms (Call 2007; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Sririam, Martin-Ortega, and Herman 2010).

The third dimension relates to *economic/social* peacebuilding practices, such as assisting with development and long-term sustainable macro-economic planning aimed to stabilize the economy of the state. Such efforts may include issues related to distributive justice and inequalities between groups, but may also include land ownership, property rights, employment, and welfare programs (Berdal 2009; Carey 2012; Donais 2005). The last dimension concerns the *psycho/social* of building peace in conflict-ridden and traumatized post-war societies. Thus, peacebuilding is here strongly associated with justice (Biggar 2003; Lambourne 2009; Lederach 1997; Murithi 2009).

In many ways, the transitional justice has moved to the forefront of the peacebuilding agenda (Bell 2009; Teitel 2000) as several contemporary conflicts have suffered from ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and genocide. It is also a core priority of the international community to hold perpetrators accountable for crimes and violence committed during war. Accordingly, it marks an end to the culture of impunity that existed during the Cold War. Moreover, to address past atrocities is viewed as critical for any durable peace settlements. One overarching assumption is therefore that processes of democratization, peacebuilding, and transitional justice are mutually reinforcing (Fukuyama 2004; Ignatieff 2003).

There are numerous empirical cases where principles of retributive justice are ingrained within the peacebuilding paradigm and practice, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Kerr and Mobekk 2007; Rotberg and Thompson 2000). Also restorative justice principles are promoted within peacebuilding, focusing on social and political processes to rebuild fractured relationships. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa is an often-referred example of where peace is seen as being achieved through the empowerment of victims and offenders (Clark 2008; Menkel-Meadow 2007; Zehr 2002).

The strong emphasis on justice in peacebuilding, however, has also caused heated debates among practitioners and scholars (Albin 2009; Herman et al. 2013). One line of argument is that justice is an essential good to be pursued, which may contribute to the consolidation of a sustainable peace. It claims that the urgency of reaching an end to violent conflict may fail to address underlying causes of conflict and violations of international humanitarian law and therefore cause peace accords to collapse. A contrasting argument considers the pursuit of justice to undermine pragmatic and more realistic peacemaking efforts, causing counterproductive results and triggering new conflicts. Yet, as Hughes, Schabas, and Thakur (2007) point out, while justice does not necessarily generate or equate to peace, it is necessary and appropriate to integrate justice in peace processes in order to produce conditions for a durable peace.

10.3.5.2 In Theory: Contesting Ideal Types of Peacebuilding

In the last two decades, the peacebuilding field has quickly been professionalized due to the increasing needs and demands of peace expertise, particularly from Western policy makers. To reduce and manage the complexities posed by contemporary conflicts, the international community has continuously strived towards a standardized, professionalized, and at times technocratic methodology of peacebuilding (Aggestam 2015; Mac Ginty 2012). Yet, despite successful outcomes in some peace processes, the peacebuilding field is still struggling with a whole range of problems and challenges, such as those posed by collapsed peace processes (Mac Ginty 2006), the non-implementation of negotiated peace agreements (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002), the resurgence of violence in post-conflict societies by so-called peace spoilers (Darby 2001; Newman and Richmond 2006), exclusion of women and other marginalized groups (Paffenholz et al. 2016), and widespread peace fatigue in long-drawn out peace processes where conflicts tend to be frozen (Aggestam and Björkdahl 2012; Perry 2009). Hence, a number of assessment studies and evaluation programs have been conducted on peacebuilding practices that aim to distil lessons learned and identify best practices (see, for example, Reychler and Schirch 2013).

The scholarly field on peacebuilding has therefore sought to generate policy relevant contributions, which, for example, is reflected in the large number of handbooks on peacebuilding produced, including tool-boxes and recommendations of suitable strategies (see, for example, UN 2010 and Ho Wong 2002). Several academic studies have examined the correlation between peacebuilding and sustainable peace from a diversity of theoretical perspectives (Newman, Paris, and Richmond 2009) and methodological approaches ranging from large-sample studies (Wallensteen 2015) to ethnographic studies (Paffenholz 2001; Richmond 2011). Yet, despite its generic drive one shared conclusion from these studies is that there is no universal blueprint of peacebuilding. Hence, greater attention is now paid to local ownership, institutions, and capacity peacebuilding.

At the same time, these evaluations and assessments have triggered major debates among scholars who hold distinct ideas of what should be viewed as efficient and sustainable peacebuilding. Newman et al. (2009) have identified three ideal types of peacebuilding: transformative, realist, and liberal. *Transformative peacebuilding* focuses on resolving the underlying causes to conflict and strive to promote a durable peace that rests on a positive interpretation of peace and social justice, which includes a desire to engage with local actors, bottom-up approaches, and the promotion of human security needs (Mac Ginty 2012). Accordingly, this is not a universalizing vision of peace but one that recognizes the importance of diverse contexts. In contrast *realist peacebuilding* puts less emphasis on resolving conflict and more on managing and containing conflict escalation. An overriding strategic concern is the establishment of international stability and order

by establishing strong states. Societal change, on the other hand, is delinked from international peacebuilding (Barnett, Songying, and Christoph 2014). Finally, *liberal peacebuilding* may be the one that most clearly articulates its vision of peace by its democracy promotion, market economy, and state-building efforts. Thus, it has guided most peacebuilding interventions in recent years. This is also why the debates mostly have centered on liberal peacebuilding where critics highlight its limitations in practice (Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011).

Contemporary peacebuilding practices have been criticized for its top-down and hegemonic interventions, which tend to create more of virtual rather than real state institutions and hybrid forms of peace as a result of the international-local interplay (Mac Ginty 2010). Also the ambition to rapidly promote democracy and market based economic reforms in post-conflict societies risk causing instability and even exacerbate conflict. In addition, ill-timed and poorly organized political elections may backfire and trigger ethnic tensions, which we have seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq. Scholarly work has highlighted the risk and vulnerabilities of conflict escalation particularly in partial democracies and transitional states. This is why Roland Paris (2004), for example, argues that institutionalization should precede liberalization.

10.3.5.3 Peacebuilding at the Crossroads

As these debates reflect, peacebuilding in practice has in many instances failed to live up to the high hopes and ambitious normative agenda articulated in the 1990s. Consequently, we are today witnessing an increasing pragmatism in peacebuilding (Barnett et al. 2014; Paris 2014), which is coupled with new major security and political challenges in global politics, such as the Russian aggression against Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, global jihadist terrorist attacks, and the expansion of the Islamic State's (IS) spheres of influence in the Middle East and elsewhere. These are taking place in parallel with the increasing failures of regional and international institutions to cope and manage these security threats with cohesive, comprehensive, and multilateral strategies, which the ongoing war in Syria tragically illustrates. The concept of resilience in peacebuilding has therefore taken hold and centers on capacity building and the strengthening of local communities themselves to prevent and manage conflict and violence (Chandler 2015). We will return to discuss resilience in further details in the concluding section of this chapter.

10.4 Particular Issues

10.4.1 State Capacity

This section discusses the link between state capacity and political violence, focusing on the outbreak of civil war and cases of state failure.[47] Indeed, some of the most influential explanations of internal conflict in recent years have singled out the lack of state capacity as a major cause of war. This perspective on "state weakness," derives directly from Hobbes' classical account of political order according to which only the Leviathan, that is the sovereign state, can guarantee peace and political stability. Thus, weak territorial control opens up a window of opportunity to rebellion challenging the state's monopoly of violence. The modern understanding of sovereignty shows how this institution developed gradually in early modern Europe through a process of institutional centralization and elimination of competing power centers (Tilly 1990). This process saw a gradual shift from pre-modern "indirect rule," that relied on feudal intermediaries and warlords, to systematic imposition of "direct rule," which enabled the state to consolidate its control over its territory, by building up an effective state bureaucracy, disarming its internal rivals, and securing enough resources through tax revenues and other types of resource extraction.

Having inspired generations of realist scholars in international relations, the Hobbesian perspective on the state and political order pervades modern theories of civil war. According to Huntington (1968: 1), "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government." On this view, too little rather than too much state is the main problem. As an account of political violence, then, the Hobbesian approach expects civil war to erupt in areas of weak statehood, because it is precisely there that rebels fighting irregular war are able to overcome numerically superior state forces.

This logic is visible in Fearon and Laitin's (2003) highly influential account of civil war. Because of the asymmetric conditions facing rural rebels, state capacity is not primarily about raw military power so much as about the state's control of its population. Fearon and Laitin argue that administratively incompetent states, especially those that extract their resources through the shortcut of oil extraction, are less likely to do their policing effectively, with large-scale violence as a consequence. Similarly, Posen (1993) offers an explanation of ethnic civil war as "emergent anarchy" whereby competing ethnic groups launch offensive attacks on each other after the collapse of multi-ethnic states, such as the former Yugoslavia. Even more drastically, Mueller (2004) reduces civil war to opportunistic predation waged by hooligans and bandits in the absence of efficient statehood. State failure constitutes the most drastic type of state weakness. In such cases of state collapse, whatever remains of the government faces multiple typically ethnic rebellions that produce a state of ungovernability and pervasive political violence (Rothberg 2004). Under such conditions, warfare will tend to become especially chaotic bringing forth widespread criminality and human rights abuse.

While situations characterized by weak statehood have indeed produced considerable violence, especially in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War, it would be premature to generalize from such cases to civil war in general (Kalyvas 2001). There can be no doubt about the importance of state capacity as a prerequisite for peace and long-term political stability, but the Hobbesian perspective suffers from a host of problems that makes it too limiting to be relied on as a general guide to peace and progress.

One obvious difficulty concerns the challenge of operationalizing and measuring state capacity. While Fearon and Laitin (2003) relied on GDP per capita and rough terrain as proxies, subsequent studies have stressed the multidimensional nature of the concept (e.g. Hendrix

[47] There is a long-standing literature on configurations of state capability as explanations of interstate conflicts (e.g. Maoz 1983).

2010). However, most of these alternative indicators also rely on averages over the entire territory of countries. Yet, there is no reason to believe that statehood is evenly distributed over the territory of states, especially in underdeveloped ones (Herbst 2000). Thus, it is essential to develop measures of local state capacity, which is becoming possible thanks to methodological advances involving geographic information systems (Tollefsen and Buhaug 2015). Road networks represent one particularly promising measure of local state capacity (Herbst 2000; Hunziker 2015).

Another problem afflicting explanations turning on state weakness is that they operate with a narrow, materialist notion of state capacity that focuses on the military might, territorial control of the population and the delivery of public goods. Yet, this somewhat "colorblind" rendering of sovereignty, fails to realize that the modern state also engages in identity formation that has the potential of generating loyalty that drastically reduces the likelihood of rebellion (Goodwin 1997). In fact, ethnically distinctive groups that differ from the center in terms of language, religion, or other markers, may react with protest and separatism if the state fails in its nation-building project (Flora 1999). Such reactions are especially likely to trigger separatist nationalism where a shift from indirect to direct rule deprives the local populations of previous autonomy (Hechter 2000) and exposes ethnically distinctive minorities to resource extraction and immigration (Weiner 1978) and "internal colonialism" (Hechter 1975). Even in Western Europe, in one of the paradigmatic cases of state strength, it took a long time to turn "peasants into Frenchmen" (Weber 1976).

Thus, the Hobbesian rendering of state capacity needs to be complemented with an understanding of how the state may serve as an instrument of established ethnic and class-based elites. Leaders of such states are prone to refer to rebels as criminals and terrorists who should be suppressed with repressive policies. Rather than producing peace, strengthening state capacity in such cases may offer repressive governments even more opportunities to marginalize and ultimately crush their domestic opponents. Whereas some scholars think that giving war a chance is the best way to bring order to war-torn countries (Luttwak 1999), it is very doubtful that lasting peace will be achieved without addressing underling injustices and inequalities (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Unless combined with inequality reduction and inclusion, the strengthening of state capacity will perpetuate violence in the long run.

10.4.2 Social Movements, Social Media, and Violence

The question posed here is about the actuality of dynamics between new "movements," conflict, and violence, and the importance of social digital media in these new dynamics. This means we are also discussing the future of social conflict theory and new conflictual intrastate dynamics.

By integrating long-time analysis on movements such as Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, and more recently Nuit Debout in France, we think that the definition of problems related to the economic crisis and cultural concerns in these new dynamics is now not weighted down by classical cultural references of "old" social movements ("nation," "revolution," "religion," for example) as it has been interpreted by including violence as a possibility in traditional social movements. New social and cultural issues seem to be expressed in *new conflicting forms pacified in their modes of action* (Ferret 2014; Wieviorka 2005, 2012).

Taken in this light, the open criticism of violence and social control in the core of these "movements" can be considered as a sign of a *real specific identity work* made by individuals or *sujets* (Touraine 1992) who plan to shape a critical opposition to global cultural values such as the verticality of social relations, the communicative power and dominant ideologies through several fields (politics, gender relations, relations between generations, etc.).

This *identity work* is based on the development of *hybrid organizations* (but it doesn't mean the end of organizations and the classic *loi d'airain d'oligarchie* of Michels) and animation against critical physical and virtual spaces dedicated to regulate and regulate the violence contained in the system of values we fight.

This *denied violence* may then be defined as the sign of a particular mediation maintained between a movement in construction and apprehended critical action, in the words of Touraine (1973, 1993), at the lowest level, that is to say, as protests manifested not by a priori guidelines framed but *positive resistances*. This construction of a *collective subject* released ideological macro-narratives should not be understood in a triumphant and heroic dimension (Touraine 1992) but as a painful work, anxious, people wary of democratic disciplines and mimetics without trying for long to break with the "system." In these new dynamics, Internet, Social Media, and powerful connectivity can be considered as *new confrontational spaces*.

On one hand, digital media can be used in the non-confrontational phase, when the opponents are at a distance. In fact, such opponents rarely communicate with each other. Each communicates with its own side, and with the unmobilized people in their network who they would like to bring in as allies. This could be analyzed with the C-Escalation/D-Escalation model of time-dynamics (Collins 2012; Collins and Sanderson 2015; Ferret 2015, 2016). In the early phase of these movements (Indignados, Nuit Debout, for example), we observed that Digital media are good for spreading narratives and images, especially since these corporate official media tend to simplify as much as possible the reality and show only the violence. These movements offer new medializations and they feed the polarization process because these digital media are prime bases for spreading rumors and reputation (the medialization of violence of the police units in the street with CopWatch). Even photo images can act as rumors, since they can be sent without attending to the surrounding context, and without giving accurate information about the identities of the persons represented. Thus, we can expect that digital media mobilize social networks to engage in more conflict and control the violence of the State.

But, on the other hand, these media have such diverse connections that they cannot generate a single, common focus of attention. They are prone to multiple definitions of reality, and tend to disperse attention to many different directions. So, we can make this into a researchable question: when do digital media generate a stronger collective focus

of attention (more people circulating the same messages), and when are they more scattered?

The answer, from situations like mobilization in Madrid and Barcelona during Indignados' mobilizations in 2011 appears to be that physical action on the ground is what generates more common attention. The social media can mobilize little groups of friends and acquaintances to go out to a place to demonstrate or fight, and the events there create focus of attention. There is some evidence that many people stayed home to watch, so that the media inhibited participation, when there was publicity about the opponents' repressive violence. So far it appears that digital media operate above all in the mobilizing phase and not in the conflict itself.

There has been a certain amount of enthusiastic propaganda about the digital age and how it is transforming society. In reality, it has been adding on to existing structures of society but not supplanting them, or even changing them very much. A powerful social conflict is when social groups organize to generate one big Durkheimian collective consciousness, full of resounding emotions; and this is best done where there is a big central place where people gather and the conflict with the enemy takes place in the historic central places of a city. The media can help publicize this but it does not eliminate *the need to physically gather for the confrontation.*

10.4.3 Inequality

Few topics are more controversial in conflict research than the link between inequality and political violence. Yet, it is important to note that both concepts are multidimensional. Here we will narrow down the latter concept to revolutions and civil wars, but it is likely that inequality is related to other types of conflict as well, including interstate war.[48]

Inequality can also be divided into subcategories. While most social science research focuses on individual-level comparisons, there is a growing realization that inequality also needs to be conceptualized and measured at the level of groups. Whereas the former can be referred to as individual or "vertical" inequality, the latter has been labeled "horizontal" inequality between culturally defined groups (Stewart 2008), or even more generally "categorical" inequality, which also includes gender (Tilly 1999).

Regardless of the level, inequality can emerge along various key dimensions. With respect to conflict, political and economic differences are arguably the most important, but other social and cultural aspects are also relevant. Since individual-level political equality is to a large extent synonymous with democracy, we will discuss those issues in the section on democracy below.

The classical literature covering the link between vertical inequality and conflict focused on peasant revolutions (Paige 1975; Scott 1976). Stressing protest against exploitative social orders and unmet expectations, these studies postulate that widely held frustrations will trigger violence (Gurr 1970). However, others questioned the extent to which grievances and inequality could be seen as causes (e.g. Tilly 1978). This classical literature failed to generate clear results (e.g. Lichbach 1989), partly because it focused almost entirely on socio-economic inequality among individuals rather than between identity groups.

This finally led many influential researchers to question the link between inequality and internal conflict altogether (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, other researchers have made efforts to measure such distinctions systematically (e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Gurr 1993; Petersen 2002).

In summary, the literature tells us that individual-level inequality can generate conflict, especially in stark cases of socioeconomic exploitation (see e.g. Wood 2003), but there is no strong evidence that there is such a regularity at the global level (though see Boix 2008). The empirical record is much more robust when it comes to the link between both political and economic inequality among ethnic groups and civil war. Contrary to claims that greed trumps grievances, recent studies have shown that political marginalization of ethnic groups increases the risk of conflict (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013).

The same goes for horizontal inequality along economic lines, as shown by Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011). Yet, the jury is still out as regards the distinction between religious and non-religious conflict. While a number of scholars argue that religious conflict is on the rise (Toft 2007), others argue that there is no strong evidence that ethno-linguistic conflicts have become eclipsed by religious strife (Bormann et al. 2017). In contrast, there is growing evidence as regards gender inequality and the onset of internal conflict (see e.g. Melander 2005) and sexual violence during such conflicts (e.g. Wood 2009).

In many cases, horizontal inequality has major repercussions on political violence beyond the borders of the state. Most importantly, in cases where ethnic groups straddle state borders, governmental elites in homeland states may take a keen interest in the well-being of their ethnic kin in neighboring states. Where such groups are both politically and economically discriminated against, the risk of interventions orchestrated by the homeland increases. The worst-case scenario features a spiral of violence that causes civil war between the ethnic minority and the government in the host state, further spilling over into irredentist warfare between the two states (Weiner 1971). While some experts believe this pattern has become much less frequent in today's world (Saideman and Ayres 2008), the eruption of violence in the Eastern Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh illustrate that irredentism cannot be written off as a thing of the past.

There is also plenty of historical evidence for a link between horizontal inequality along ethnic lines and civilian victimization. Mann (2005) shows that ideological repression of indigenous populations by colonist settlers and ethnic minorities by ethnonationalists has generated waves of ethnic cleansing and genocide during the past two centuries. However, because the leading datasets have so far not been coded with respect to the ethnicity of the victim groups, there is less systematic comparative evidence on the link between political and economic

[48] We will discuss some of these links in the section on democracy below.

dimensions of ethnic inequality and one-sided violence, but thanks to new data collection efforts, this situation is fortunately about to change.

What do all these findings imply for the prevention and reduction of political violence? If inequality causes violence, it can reasonably be expected that decreasing inequality will lead to pacification. Obviously, this presupposes that inequality can be changed in the first place, which is more likely in the case of political as opposed to economic asymmetries. But it is important to see how even political inclusion may be extremely difficult to achieve, especially in a climate of mistrust and resentment following a larger conflict. Exactly how to bring members of marginalized groups into politics is a matter of dispute. Whereas most scholars support various schemes of power sharing at the group level (e.g. Gurr 2000; Lijphart 1977; Mattes and Savun 2009), others are much more skeptical (e.g. Roeder 2005). The fear is that power sharing will cement societal, and especially ethnic divides, making it impossible to transcend them.[49] This, in itself, could lead to rigid and brittle arrangements that lock the country into a conflict spiral that will see violent conflict recur sooner or later. In addition, territorial power sharing, such as federalism and autonomy, may also provide potential secessionists with resources to stage future rebellions, thus creating a state in the state that is ready to secede at any time, as illustrated by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the USSR (e.g. Snyder 2000).

Such pessimism, however, is most likely exaggerated, at least as a general analysis, because the comparisons fail to take into account that power-sharing arrangements are typically invoked in particularly difficult conflict cases, which means that their pacifying tends to be underestimated (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016). Furthermore, the power-sharing skeptics assume that the alternatives, such as US-style individualist centralized solutions, are even less likely to trigger violence, which is a dubious assumption in case of ethnically divided post-conflict settings (McGarry and O'Leary 2009).

If equalizing policies are likely to deliver peace, a decrease of inequality would be especially welcome. In fact, there is good news in this respect. Whereas economic inequality among households within the same countries has been increasing in most parts of the world (Bourguignon 2015; Milanovic 2016), the overall global trend in domestic horizontal inequality seems to be the opposite. Especially in Asia, marginalized ethnic groups have been able to partially catch up with their countries' average income. Yet, the main exception to this trend is sub-Saharan Africa, where marginalized groups are lagging further behind (Bormann et al. 2016). However, this unfortunate effect may be compensated by reduced political inequality. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic inclusion through power sharing and group rights has been increasing since the end of the Cold War. This pattern appears to be part of a more general "regime of accommodation" that has contributed to the decrease of violence during this period (Gurr 2000).

10.4.4 Regime Type and Peace

Following up the general discussion of inequality and conflict above, this section conceptualizes democracy as an issue of political equality at the individual level. Nevertheless, group-level equality remains pertinent as a background factor, since democratic governance presupposes a "demos" (Dahl 1989), that is a unit constituting the voting population, which is often defined in ethnic terms (Mann 2005).[50] Given a reasonably inclusive demos, democracy boils down to contestation open to participation (Dahl 1971), which in turn calls for effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding by the citizens, and control of the agenda (Dahl 1989).

What do we know about democracy and conflict? The democratic peace literature is a natural place to start. Building on Kant's (1795) famous political philosophy, contemporary scholarship tells us that there is virtually no warfare between democratic states.[51] Despite some dissenting voices, most researchers agree that there is a very robust link between the presence of democracy and no or little interstate conflict due to both institutional and normative mechanisms (e.g. Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001; for a review, see Hegre 2014). The former mechanism tells us that democracies are better than authoritarian regimes at aggregating the (presumably) pacific preferences of the wider population that has to carry most of the costs of war. The latter mechanisms stresses that democracy is a system of peaceful conflict resolution that tends to externalize such peaceful norms to relations with other democracies.

The "domestic democratic peace" follows similar lines. Compared to authoritarian rule, democracy can be expected to exhibit less group-level exclusion, while offering peaceful means of contestation and constraints on the use of violence by governments (Hegre 2014). In this sense, democratic governance serves as a tool to overcome commitment problems between wealthy elites and poor masses (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). Yet, as already indicated, all this presupposes that the demos problem has been resolved. Failure to do so can spawn ethnic separatist war and even repression along ethnic lines, as illustrated by long-standing conflicts in Turkey and Israel. Furthermore, incompletely institutionalized semi-democracies may be more prone to violence than established full democracies because they offer more opportunities to mass participation without institutional safeguards against populist extremism and manipulation of key institutions, including the courts, the media, and elections. Accordingly, Hegre et al. (2001) suggest that conflict risk follows an inverted U-curve, which means that it is really the semi-democracies that are the least stable, although the evidence remains somewhat mixed as regards this regularity (Hegre 2014). In contrast, there is no support for the simple linear proposition that more democracy means less civil war.

With respect to one-sided violence and repression, regime type also appears to play an important role. Davenport (2004) proposes that the domestic democratic peace does exist with respect to state repression.

[49] Also, power sharing after conflict may marginalize moderate voices within each group, while giving the radicals a seat at the table (Jarstad 2008).

[50] The crux is that this unit cannot be determined through voting for logical reasons, so in this sense democracy presupposes a high degree of agreement as to the membership criteria within the demos and cannot coexist with high degrees of horizontal inequality.

[51] It should be noted, however, that the extent to which democracies are more peaceful in their relations with non-democratic states is much more controversial (see Hegre 2014).

In an influential study, Harff (2003) claims that democracy contributes to preventing genocide. At the same time, however, democracies may be more prone to be targeted by terrorists because the openness of such systems make them more vulnerable to extortion by violent groups (for a review, see Valentino 2014).

In contrast to the optimism expressed by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush's attempts to spread democracy as a foreign policy goal, the realization that democratization, as opposed to stable democracy, may be disproportionally vulnerable to both interstate and intrastate conflict needs to be taken seriously. Following similar lines as the arguments about semi-democracy and conflict mentioned above, these scholars stress how authoritarian elites may attempt to stay in power through ethnic outbidding by extremists who try to overtrump each other with increasingly extremist views (Horowitz 1985). Likewise, incomplete democracies appear to be more likely to experience diversionary war, implying that elites try to stay in power and deflect from their own weaknesses by launching foreign military adventures (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Especially where the demos is contested, there is no guarantee that the opening of a previously authoritarian system will not produce a surge in exclusive ethno-nationalism.

While this literature has managed to convince many researchers that there are such adverse effects, serious measurement difficulties continue to haunt research on democratization and war, especially because the former concept is difficult to operationalize based on highly aggregated democracy indices. For this reason, a number of studies have tried to unpack the notion of democratic governance by focusing on aspects of democracy, such as for example elections (e.g. Wilkinson 2004). The evidence that civil wars may be more likely both before and after elections is growing (e.g. Brancati and Snyder 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug 2013). Other aspects of regime type that call for increased scrutiny are the rule of law, the role of media, and the interaction with ethnic inclusion through territorial and governmental power sharing, or the extension of group rights.

Given these open empirical questions, it does not come as a surprise that there is a lively debate about how to approach democratization in the context of development of peacemaking (Crocker and Hampson 2007). Although there is general agreement that fully institutionalized democracy is peaceful and stable, the main issue concerns how to get there from a starting point characterized by both a lack of democracy and deep divisions, possibly including past or ongoing civil war. The ill-fated US intervention in Iraq in 2003 has been particularly sobering for the democratization enthusiasts and has arguably vindicated those who warn against the conflict-fueling effect of democratization. Yet Western support for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East along pragmatic geopolitical lines stressing "security first" does not seem to be a recipe for stability and peace either. It makes little sense to recommend a unified pace of democratization that would fit all societies, but the goal of establishing political equality, the rule of law, and popular legitimacy clearly cannot be postponed for ever. For sure, it would be futile to try to impose majoritarian democracy on deeply divided, conflict-torn states. As argued above, democracy needs to be combined with some type of governmental and possibly territorial power sharing, even though such systems deviate from basic democratic principles such as one-person-one-vote.

10.4.5 Geopolitics and Power Re-Configurations

The complexities of the present international order that we have illustrated in this chapter with respect to war, terrorism, violence, and (inadequate) global security measures has also prompted a discussion on geopolitics.[52] Today, the concept of geopolitics is often used as a synonym for "power politics" and presented as an alternative to international institutionalism represented by the idea of the "liberal" international order (Ikenberry 2001). Users of "geopolitics" imply that universal approaches are less valid today and that distinct geographically areas exhibit different political circumstances. It suggests that the Western-led type of international order envisaged after the end of the Cold War is now being challenged in regionally different ways. Thus, we need to consider these arguments and assess their validity.

Many argue that the decline of the power of the United States has a significant impact on international order. Unlike typical "power politics" among a limited number of powers in traditional European international society in the nineteenth century or the global confrontation between the two ideological camps during the Cold War period, the current world entails geographically distinctive power configurations. The rise of China may threaten US influence in East Asia. The withdrawal of the United States left the Middle East as a power vacuum, then experiencing serious confrontations among regional powers and sectarianism. Europe now finds itself in a "Great Game" style of confrontation between NATO and Russia. The impact of the war on terror-strategy on the spread of Islamic radicalism is associated with deteriorating security conditions in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

Also security measures and peace operations vary in accordance with geopolitical configurations. We have observed regional variations in previous sections of this chapter, but additional examples can illustrate this. The United Nations is primarily active for peace and security in Africa, having operational partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, such as AU, ECOWAS, and IGAD. In Europe, regional organizations, notably EU, NATO, and OSCE, undertake their own operations without involving outside actors. In the Middle East regional organizations (Arab League, GCC, OIC) and regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey) compete for greater influence in the region. As there are only modest regional organizations in South, South East, and East Asia, direct links to the United States are instead seen to be more important for peacemaking efforts. Regardless of one's views of geopolitics in the contemporary world, it seems true that the efforts on conflict and peace vary due to differing circumstances among the world's regions.

At this point, it may be instructive to recall traditional theorists of geopolitics, Halford J. Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman, to evaluate their significance in the context of the twenty-first century. The founder of "geopolitics," Mackinder, is known for concepts such as "pivot," "heartland," "crescent," "bridge head" in addition to "land power" and "sea power." Using this terminology, the United States is a special "sea power" maintaining worldwide alliance with other major "sea powers" such as Britain, Japan, and Australia. The traditional US stronghold in the Western Hemisphere is a large "outer crescent"

[52] See, for instance, Mead (2014) and Ikenberry (2014).

area. To this is added traditional US "bridge heads" in the "inner crescent," today referring to NATO allies, Egypt, India, and Korea. On the other hand, the challenges against the American "sea power" exist in the "pivot" "heartland" area and some volatile parts of the Eurasian continent that constitute the "world island." The most famous dictum of Mackinder, referring to the two World Wars is "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World." Translating this to contemporary conditions it would suggest that the most significant geopolitical phenomenon at this moment is the possibility of NATO's eastward expansion and the counter-reactions by Russia over areas such as Ukraine and the Caucasus (Mackinder 1919).

Spykman asserted that Mackinder was misleading in his excessive emphasis on Eastern Europe by pointing to the importance of the "Rimland" with or against sea powers and land powers. According to Spykman, rephrasing Mackinder, those who dominate the Rimland will dominate the world. The United States as a hegemon failed over Rimland like the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq during and after the Cold War by losing ground in its search for dominance of the world. One important observation is that the other superpower, China, in the Rimland, is in an "amphibious" zone and needs to cooperate or confront with both sea powers and land powers (Spykman 1944).

During the interwar period with the surge of founding fathers of theories of geopolitics, the type of international order based upon regional discrepancies was intensively discussed by researchers as well as practitioners. The Axis countries' ideas about a German Monroe Doctrine for Europe and the Japanese version for Asia reflected elements in the strategic debates before the Second World War. The United States as well as the European imperial powers sought to identify a way to accommodate regionalism in order to establish a worldwide system of international order (Rosenboim 2014). The advent of the Second World War and the creation of the post-1945 international order emerged in the wake of the collapse of regionalist views of power politics.

In the twenty-first century our quest for social progress would not allow us to simply reproduce the power configurations during the interwar period. But if geopolitical perspectives may entail critical insights into the reality of international politics, we may have to identify the appropriate manner we apply theories of geopolitics in our contemporary world. To consider geographically different circumstances is necessary for smooth and peaceful progress of international society, but does not necessarily require the vocabulary of geopolitics or its deterministic perspective.

10.4.6 Global Governance and International Institutions

Hedley Bull, a leading personality in the so-called English School in the discipline of international relations, defined "international society" as a society of states, which, "conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull 1977: 13). Following Bull's conception, we can still distinguish between formal and informal institutions of international society. Bull himself was interested in informal ones, for instance, the balance of power, war, and Great Powers, while he fully recognized the importance of treaty-based formal international organizations such as the United Nations as channels for international law and diplomacy.

In the contemporary world, there are a large number of international institutions including those created for the purpose of peace and security.[53] Ranging from the UN as a global body where the Security Council has far-reaching authority under Chapter VII to more mediation/arbitration style conflict resolution mechanisms by regional organizations such as EU, AU, and international courts, notably ICJ. Global governance of formal international institutions has developed considerably since the middle of the twentieth century compared to any other time in human history. The possibility of creating world government was discussed in conjunction with the creation of the League of Nations as well as its successor the United Nations. Instead of relying on one comprehensive international governmental body, international society in our age is constituted by numerous formal international institutions demarcated according to functions, geography, and politics. Perhaps the warning by Bull against the "domestic analogy" was heralded, but it is more correct to say that the state structures were stronger and have remained so. For instance, the state's welfare functions have made it important to the inhabitants in other ways than the traditional physical protection of the population. International order has to be maintained in a manner that is very different from any domestic order. Global governance by international institutions is advancing in a highly complex way, without any deliberate attempts to create any form of central world government. In fact, the 2010s has witnessed a backlash against, for instance, regional international organizations having too much influence.[54]

One may argue that informal institutions are quite important in international "anarchical society." As Bull pointed out, there are roles of major powers that also include the possibility of enforcement action. The recent discussion can be exemplified by concepts such as "PoC (protection of civilians)" and "R2P (responsibility to protect)," which all have a position in the UN documentation and have been referred to in Security Council decisions, although they have no formal standing in the UN Charter. The same is true for armed peacekeeping operations, which were first introduced in 1956 and now have evolved into multidimensional mission and with considerable flexibility in cooperation with regional and other international organizations, notably for support of intelligence, logistics, military technologies, professional civilian expertise, etc. Advanced activities to contribute to peace and security include the highly expanded spheres of development aid,

[53] According to Wallensteen and Bjurner (2015: Appendix B) there are 31 regional or transregional interstate organizations dealing with peace and security. The total number of international organizations is estimated to be about 68,000 according to the Yearbook of International Organizations (www.uia.org/faq/intorgs1) of which some 5,000 are inter-governmental. Those dealing with security is thus but a fraction of the total.

[54] The British referendum of June 2016 resulted in a rejection of the country's membership in the European Union, stimulating similar thoughts elsewhere. However, there has not been a debate about leaving the United Nations, not even under the UN-critical Bush Jr. administration in the United States.

humanitarian aid, rule of law reforms, human rights promotion, democratization assistance, etc.

What is striking is the ability to informally reorganize formal institutions. The concept of "partnership peacekeeping" is a key word in the current trend of international responses to crises of conflicts.[55] The United Nations is no longer a single or even a main implementer of international peace operations. When UN deploys large missions in Africa, for instance, UN seeks to collaborate with regional and subregional organizations such as AU and ECOWAS. Thus, in 2016, 9 of 16 UN peacekeeping missions were in Africa.[56] An additional five operations were based in the Middle East and the Balkans. It is a pattern that is likely to continue. A challenge will be to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Syria, once the war is over. One may think that there is a regional division of labor, where organizations such as EU, NATO, and OSCE act in Europe and in the Mediterranean area, where there are other arrangements for other regions. The special position of the United States in global governance is also an issue to be explored for the purpose of developing international institutions. These informal settings and considerations decisively affect the way peace operations are conducted by formal international institutions. The phenomenon of informal combinations of formal international institutions is a reflection of the complex reality of our contemporary world.

For instance, enforcement actions based upon Chapter VII authority is an institutional framework of the original design of the UN Charter. However, the use of Chapter VII has been developed through informal arrangements and consultations, not specified in the Charter. The now established pattern of granting Chapter VII authority to almost all the UN peacekeeping missions for specific mandates of PoC (protection of civilians) is an example of this. At the end of the Cold War the Security Council actually discussed other possible threats to international peace and security, such as those arising from economic, social, humanitarian, and environmental crises.[57] As we say in Section 10.3 of this chapter, for instance in Figure 10.13, the resort to action under Chapter VII is a crucial element in present global governance.

However, one may argue that the special power of the Security Council is also a serious problem due to its disproportionate representation. The permanent members of the Security Council have considerable power over decisions due to their legal right to use a veto, but also to the permanency of their position. While other states come and go as members, not staying longer than two years, the major powers have been in the Council since its inception, more than 70 years ago. Given that any reform of the composition of the Security Council is difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future, the legitimacy of the Security Council will continue to remain a crucial topic and thus require careful attention by the stakeholders in and outside of UN.

The special power of the permanent members of the Security Council is highly related to the ideological framework of contemporary international society. Some leading members of the Security Council regard their ideological foundation, which could be characterized as "liberal values" of the West, as the natural framework for informal international institutionalism. Non-Western states are suspicious in this regard and worry that the United States and its allies are trying to impose their own standards on other states that may not share the same values at all or to the same extent. There is a danger that informal international institutionalism could lead to mistrust among various international actors. Fundamental consideration should be given to the importance of constant search for an appropriate balance between formal and informal international institutions of stable, solid, and sustainable global governance.

10.4.7 The Weakness of Global Society

The issue of violence and war requires the member states of the international society to find way to protect themselves. A typical way is to arm oneself against external threats, as well as against internal challenges. The logic of international threats would suggest that common activity against shared threats would be more logical. This is the reason for the existence of international and regional organizations within the field of peace and security. However, for most states the reliance on own national defense and national police remains the preferred option. Only Costa Rica and Iceland have opted for not having armed forces. Even the resort to shared peacekeeping operations is limited, although it would constitute a reasonable compromise between reliance on national vs. global resources. Table 10.5 demonstrates this very strongly. It lists the 10 countries that contribute the most to UN peacekeeping, as of 2016. The ordering of the countries follows the size of their assessed contributions (the third column) and the numbers can be compared to the military expenditures for the countries as a whole. By comparing to the GDP of the country the investment in national efforts can easily be compared to those going to international efforts for peace and security. For most of these countries the peacekeeping contributions are less than two hundredths of a percent of GDP compared to the 2 percent on average going to the national military expenditure. It is an illustration of the weakness of the resources going to the international efforts. The nationally controlled policies strongly outpace the global efforts. The logical solution of dealing with global challenges in common efforts still is far from the reality within the field of peace and security. The trends, furthermore, are not encouraging for international efforts, judging by pronouncement of the Trump administration in the United States.

10.5 Conclusion

International peace and security is at the crossroads with regards to agenda, practice, and theory. It has led to a search for alternative models of thought, sometimes explicitly aimed at replacing the 'liberal peacebuilding paradigm'. For instance, the notion of resilience has resurfaced and become attractive to academics and practitioners. Another concept is "sustaining peace," which has been incorporated in a number of UN resolutions, both by the Security Council and the General

[55] "Partnering for Peace: Moving Towards Partnership Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General," UN Document, S/2015/229, April 1, 2015.
[56] Information provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, website www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml.
[57] Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Document, S/23500, January 31, 1992.

Table 10.5 | The top 10 providers of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations 2016. Military expenditures versus UN peacekeeping contributions

Country	Military expenditure (100 millions USD)	Military expenditure as % of country's GDP	Peacekeeping contributions(100 millions USD)*	Peacekeeping contributions as % of country's GDP
United States	6189	3.3	2.2496	0.012
China	2184	1.9	0.8102	0.007
Japan	467	1.0	0.7622	0.016
Germany	416	1.2	0.5031	0.014
France	564	2.3	0.4968	0.020
UK	489	1.9	0.4566	0.017
Russia	701	5.3	0.3157	0.025
Italy	282	1.5	0.2952	0.016
Canada	157	1.0	0.2299	0.015
Spain	151	1.2	0.1921	0.015

* Peacekeeping contributions calculated from each country's percentage contribution relative to total UN Peacekeeping Operations for June 2016–July 2017 budget.
Data sources:
SIPRI World Military Expenditures Database
GDP by Country, World Bank Group
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Data Compiled by Global Policy Forum.

Assembly (e.g. in 2016) or the academically grounded "quality peace." These conceptions all acknowledge the complexity and multi-layered nature in the construction of peace. Also, they share the approach of not imposing a specific model or agenda for peace, but rather to facilitate, strengthen, and create space for existing national and local capabilities to cope with violent change and sustain peace within a global setting.

Some sections of this chapter indicate that the world has – for the past 25 years – seen a shift of authority from national states to more global cooperation, where coordination of interests has been the central concern, often captured by the term "globalization." There is much historical evidence to suggest that such forms of cooperation, particularly among major powers, ensure predictability and a reduction in the risks of wars among states. At the same time, the rise of civil wars, unilateral military interventions (notably in Iraq, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria) with novel techniques (drone warfare, targeted assassinations, cyberattacks, unidentified troops) and increasing emphasis on national interests (whether Chinese, Russian, British, or American) reduce the incentives for cooperation. Under such conditions mutual concerns are no longer seen as legitimate, unless they fit with particularistic interests. There are, thus, reasons to consider that the world in the middle of the 2010s finds itself at a crucial moment breaking away from some patterns of the past quarter-century. The expression used by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the General Assembly in September 2003 when facing the situation when two permanent members of the Security Council had invaded a sovereign country without a UN mandate may be even more pertinent: "Excellences, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded."[58]

The UN may have weathered the situation in 2003, the role of global institutions regained some standing. By 2015 the world had agreed both on new development goals (Agenda 2030, which includes Goal 16 for the development of peaceful societies) and actions for climate change (Paris Agreement 2015). Nevertheless, an undercurrent emphasizing exceptionality and nationalism surfaced strongly just a year later, 2016, exemplified by the referendum in the UK to leave the European Union, the negative Colombian popular vote on a peace agreement to end 50 years of civil war (but the process is finally going on reasonably) the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, the authoritarian turn of Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, and a global decline in the rate of democracy. More obviously than in a long time, there is a choice between a world with global governance based on concerns for universal human security (as advocated by Kofi Annan, above) and one based on forms of exclusive national sovereignty of ethnically and/or confessionally defined rights. And between these two levels, the global and the national, one should consider the role of regional cooperation, such as the European Union and the African Union.

The social progress documented in this chapter has largely required international cooperation and globally shared frameworks. Without that, much social progress is directly challenged. Thus, developing action to further cooperative solutions, with international, transnational, regional, or global forms appears more urgent than ever. This, of course, without promoting one particular societal form, but still building on globally shared values and empirically grounded policies.

In particular, the dangers arising from social inequalities within and between societies constitute a recurrent factor in analyses of cause of conflicts, wars, one-side violence, and terrorism. This refers to matters such as unequal access to power, protection, resources, education, and other basic goods for different segments of the population (whether considering gender, ethnic, religious, regional, or other social categories). Thus, a global agenda for lessening inequalities and increasing societal integration would have the benefit of reducing violence over the long term as well as constituting social progress in itself, by incorporating universal respect for human dignity.

[58] Kofi Annan to the UN General Assembly, September 23, 2003, www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm

Furthermore, matters of physical security for social groups and vulnerable communities would need to be part of such an agenda. What happens after a war is important for the prevention of a recurrence of war. Respecting the rights to fair processes, democratic opportunities, and individual security for men and women alike is essential for long-term social progress, after termination of violent conflict and for the prevention of possible future violent conflicts. The problem in fact is not disputes and conflicts, but violence. In many respects, the transition of societies from violent to institutionalized, and continuous management and resolution of conflict is an important aspect of social progress.

Without a global agenda for dealing with violence and war through concerted action, the actors might instead find remedies, based on parochial efforts for social progress, for instance resorting to the local use of non-violent action, without an expectation of international support. This, furthermore, may be met with violent repression, particularly if there is a vacuum in international enforcement of human rights and humanitarian law. Such a decoupling between international, national and local norms and interests can result in greater harms being perpetrated against civilians, journalists and political dissidents. Finding ways to constructively connect the levels of global society may be necessary for making globally shared social progress, fairness, and human dignity attainable in the foreseeable future.

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